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ABSTRACT
MULTI–PERIOD INVENTORY MODELS WITH PRICE
PROTECTION
Nurdan Ahat
M.S. in Industrial Engineering
Supervisor: Assist. Prof. Dr. Osman Alp , Assist. Prof. Dr. Alper S¸en
July, 2007
In an environment with declining sales prices, retailers (or any reseller) often
face the risk of buying high and selling low. In order to limit their channel
partners’ exposure to such risks and increase the availability of their products
in the marketplace, suppliers often offer price protection. With price protection,
a retailer is reimbursed with a percentage of the procurement cost declines, for
the inventory that the retailer ordered within a given price protection age limit.
We study the optimal inventory policy of the retailer under such price protection
terms in a multi–period finite horizon setting with stochastic demand. We propose
three different models for the treatment of unsatisfied demand. For the case of
full backlogging, we show that the order–up–to type policies are optimal. In a
numerical study, we study the behavior of the retailer and investigate the impact
of price protection terms on the operational performance of the retailer and the
supplier under a variety of settings.
Keywords: Inventory models, price protection, supply chain management, high–
tech industry.
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O¨ZET
FI˙YAT KORUMASI ALTINDA C¸OK DO¨NEMLI˙
ENVANTER MODELLERI˙
Nurdan Ahat
Endu¨stri Mu¨hendislig˘i, Yu¨ksek Lisans
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Yrd. Doc¸. Dr. Osman Alp, Yrd. Doc¸ Dr. Alper S¸en
Temmuz, 2007
Satıs¸ fiyatlarının giderek du¨s¸tu¨g˘u¨ bir ortamda, parakendeciler (veya herhangi bir
satıcı) bir u¨ru¨nu¨ yu¨ksek fiyatla alıp daha du¨s¸u¨k fiyatla satma riskiyle yu¨z yu¨zedir.
Tedarikc¸iler, perakendecilerin bu tu¨r risklere maruz kalmasını engellemek ve
u¨ru¨nlerin pazardaki hazır bulunabilirlig˘ini arttırmak amacıyla, perakendecilere
fiyat koruma stratejilerini sunmaktadır. Fiyat koruma stratejileri sayesinde, per-
akendecinin stog˘unda bulunan, belirli bir zaman aralıg˘ında ısmarlanan envanterin
fiyatında go¨zlenen du¨s¸u¨s¸lerin belirli bir yu¨zdesi perakendeciye tedarikc¸i tarafından
iade edilir. Bu tezde, tedarikc¸inin perakendeciye belirlenen terimlerle fiyat ko-
ruma stratejisi uyguladıg˘ı, c¸ok do¨nemli ve sonlu ufuklu bir ortamda rassal talep al-
tinda perakendecinin en iyi envanter kontol politikasının belirlenmesi problemiyle
ilgilenilmektedir. Zamanında kars¸ılanamayan talebi farklı s¸ekilde ele alan u¨c¸
model o¨nerilmektedir. Zamanında kars¸ılanamayan talebin tamamının daha sonra
kars¸ılandıg˘ı durumlarda seviye esaslı politikaların optimal oldug˘u go¨sterilmis¸tir.
Sayısal c¸alıs¸malar ile, c¸es¸itli ortamlarda perakendecinin davranıs¸ı incelenmis¸ fiyat
koruma politikası kos¸ullarının perakendecinin ve tedarikc¸inin operasyonel perfor-
manslarına etkisi aras¸tırılmıs¸tır.
Anahtar so¨zcu¨kler : Envanter sistemleri, fiyat koruması, tedarik zinciri yo¨netimi,
yu¨ksek teknoloji endu¨strisi.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The high-tech products are characterized by their short life cycles and high de-
mand variability. The suppliers of these products usually use direct and indirect
channels to serve the customers. In the direct channel, the demand is satisfied
by the supplier by means of catalogs, mail or internet sales, while in the indirect
channel, the demand is satisfied through the distributors, retailers, partners, and
etc.
In order to survive in the high-tech market, the supplier needs to offer new
products to the market. This reduces the appeal and necessitates reductions in
the price of the older products in both direct and indirect channels. Sometimes,
suppliers also offer price reductions on older products prior to introduction of new
products in order to clear the channel of older inventory. Frequent and significant
price declines creates the risk of buying high and selling low for the participants of
the indirect channel. Therefore, the indirect channel has less incentive for buying
the products at the beginning of their life cycle; this leads to reduced availability
of new products in the market. In order to limit the indirect channel’s exposure
to the risk of buying high and selling low and increase the availability of the
product in the market, the manufacturers often offer return or price protection
policies.
With price protection, if the supplier reduces the list price of an item, he
1
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reimburses the channel participants the difference between what they have paid
and the current price for all inventories they have ordered but not yet sold. In
some cases, the supplier may impose an age limit on inventories that the channel
partners can claim reimbursements, i.e. the protection is valid for only those items
that are ordered within a certain period of time. Also, he may impose a limit on
the magnitude of the price protection credit, i.e. only a certain percentage of the
price change is credited.
Price protection enables the retailer to maintain its profit margin regardless
of the price offered by the supplier and reduces the cost of carrying inventory
for the retailer. While more price protection is always better for the retailer, the
supplier needs to trade off between increased availability of its products in the
market and the “cost” of price protection. Price protection can be costly for the
supplier in two ways. First type of costs are concrete: with every price decline
the manufacturer reimburses the difference between the paid price and current
price for the inventory held but not sold in the indirect channel. The second
type of costs can be caused by excessive amount of inventory that is carried by
the indirect channel due to price protection. This may result in supplier having
difficulty in introducing new products to the market as its pipeline is full of older
inventory. In addition, price protection limits the supplier’s control in tactical
pricing. This may be true not only in indirect channel but also in direct channel,
as the industry evidence shows that the retail prices in traditional channels are
usually same as the prices in supplier’s direct channel (See [7] for a few examples).
When considering a price drop, the supplier needs to take into account the amount
of channel inventory for which needed to be reimbursed under the price protection
policy (this is in addition to demand elasticity, competition, amount of component
inventory and all other factors that impact a pricing decision). Payments to
the channel due to price protection may potentially erase all the benefits that
the manufacturer is seeking from a price drop. If not managed properly, price
protection costs may add up to significant levels.
Many companies in the high–tech industry adopted price protection policies
for their indirect channel. Examples include Hewlett Packard, Apple, Compaq,
IBM, Seagate, and Maxtor which offer various price protection and return terms in
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
their contracts to ensure availability of their products in the market ([2], [15], [16],
[11], [13]). Hewlett Packard (HP) developed a metric called inventory-driven costs
which identifies price protection costs to be one of the major hidden components
of cost of holding inventory [2]. Many companies have frequent adjustments to
their price protection policies in an effort to strike a balance between keeping
their indirect customers happy (hence, the availability of their products in retail)
and reducing their price protection costs. Various articles report changes to price
protection policies by major companies. Compaq set an age limit of 15 days on
price protection [16]. HP announced a reduction in price protection for personal
computers [1]. Apple first had set an age limit of 30 days on price protection, but
then had to reinstate the full protection after pressure from its indirect customers
[15].
In order for the supplier to evaluate any price protection policy alternative,
the supplier needs to have a good understanding of how the indirect channel
reacts to price changes in the existence of a price protection mechanism. Pre-
requisite to this is understanding channel behavior under fixed prices and a given
price protection mechanism. In this thesis, we study the inventory problem of
an indirect channel partner (e.g. a retailer) who faces decreasing prices and is
offered a price protection policy in a multi–period setting. The retailer’s problem
is modeled under the assumption of standard backordering, modified backordering
(which allows the loyal customer to buy the item from the newer price), and lost
sales. Also, the cost of the price protection policy to the supplier is determined
assuming that the retailer is rational and operating with an optimal decision rule.
The organization of the thesis is as follows:
In Chapter 2, we provide a review of the literature in the price protection
mechanisms and supply chain coordination.
In Chapter 3, we model the ordering problem of the retailer for three different
assumptions for the case of shortages. The first of these is the Standard Backorder
Model (SBM), in which the retailer can satisfy the demand later. The customer
is charged with the price that is used when the customer first appears. The
retailer incurs a backorder cost for each item satisfied with a delay. The second
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application for the excess demand is the Modified Backorder Model (MBM), in
which the retailer satisfies the demand after a while, incurs a backorder cost for
each item backordered as in Standard Backorder Model. However this time the
owner of the backordered items is charged with the price that is effective when
the customer demand is satisfied. The third application for the excess demand
is the Lost Sales Model (LSM). In this model excess demand is completely lost.
The retailer incurs a shortage cost for each demand lost. The optimal decision
rule for the retailer when the supplier offers price protection is determined to be
order-up-to type policy for the SBM and MBM.
In Chapter 4, a numerical study with different problem parameters is con-
ducted under MBM and LSM. The optimal decision rule of the retailer is verified
to be order-up-to type policy for the MBM and it is observed that the optimal
ordering policy for the retailer is also order-up-to type in LSM. The cost paid for
the price protection policy by the supplier and the service levels of the retailer is
determined when the retailer behaves rationally and applies the optimal order-up-
to policy for ordering decisions. The simulation results indicate that the service
levels of the retailer increases by introducing price protection. The increment in
the service levels decreases as the age of the unsold inventory protected by the
supplier increases.
In Chapter 5, we summarize our results and contributions to the literature,
and suggest future research directions.
Chapter 2
Literature Survey
In this chapter we study the literature that is closely related to the problem
under concern. We begin with the seminal work of Clark and Scarf [3] who model
multi-period stochastic inventory problems with dynamic programming. In their
paper, a single installation multi-period inventory problem whose objective is
to minimize the cost over the horizon is modeled. A positive lead time for the
replenishment of the orders is assumed. The state vector at any period is defined
as the outstanding orders plus the inventory level of the retailer. A purchasing
decision is made at the retailer level after the orders that are placed lead time
periods ago are received and they also consider the holding and the shortage costs
of the retailer. They assume that the excess demand is backordered. The authors
discuss that the optimal decision rule for the retailer is order-up-to type.
In an other stream of research, there are articles which attempt to model the
price changes in the multi-period stochastic inventory environments. Gavirneni
[6] models the periodic review inventory problem where the product prices change
in a Markovian fashion from one period to the next. The product prices decline
from one period to the other where the decline structure is defined in a probability
transition matrix which is assumed to be regenerative and communicative. It is
assumed that there are no set up costs, capacity restrictions, nor lead times. The
unsatisfied demand is lost and a linear holding cost for extra inventory on hand
is incurred. Under all these assumptions, the author shows that the optimal
5
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ordering policy of the retailer is a base stock policy in a single period, finite
horizon or discounted infinite horizon problems. Also [4] models the single item,
periodic review inventory problem when the demand is stochastic but depends
on the the selling prices of the item. They characterize the structure of the
optimal pricing and inventory strategy and develop a value iteration method for
calculating the optimal strategies. In [5], they consider multiple retailers in the
same setting when the demand distribution at each retailer can vary. In the
paper, an approximate model for the problem is developed and combined pricing,
ordering and allocation strategies are provided.
Another paper that models the price decline of the product in a multi-period
environment is by Wang [14]. A single item, single location inventory system that
is reviewed periodically and that faces a stochastic demand is considered. The
demands of the successive periods are independent and identically distributed.
The acquisition cost of the item in the successive periods is modeled as decreasing
random variables. Therefore, the selling price of the item decreases in the unit
acquisition cost as well. Two pricing fashions are handled in the paper: The
retailer price is determined by adding a fixed percent mark-up or fixed amount
mark-up to the acquisition cost of the item. It is shown that the order-up-to type
policy is optimal for the backorder and the lost sales models.
Price protection problem is first introduced by Lee et al. [8]. They consider
a 2-period problem in which the supplier offers the retailer a protection policy.
They assume that the manufacturer has no capacity restrictions, the set-up cost is
negligible, and the excess demand is lost. They consider two cases for purchasing
action of the retailer: the retailer may have a single buying or two buying oppor-
tunity. In the single buying opportunity case, it is shown that a properly chosen
protection credit coordinates the channel and guarantees a win-win situation. It
is shown that the optimal order quantity of the retailer without protection policy
is strictly less than the optimal order quantity of the integrated channel with
price protection policy.
In the two buying opportunity case, it is shown that the order-up-to type
policy is optimal and the order-up-to level of the retailer stays the same with
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price protection or without price protection in the second period. However, the
optimal order quantity of the first period is larger when the supplier offers the
retailer a price protection policy. Since the order-up-to level does not change in
the second period and the demand is coming from the same distribution in both
cases, optimal order quantity in the second period is non-increasing. Therefore,
the overall impact of the price protection policy on the retailer’s situation is that
the total order quantity throughout the horizon increases or stays the same. If
the acquisition cost of the item is set in two periods, price protection does not
guarantee channel coordination. If the supplier is allowed to adjust the acquisition
cost and the protection rebate simultaneously, the assumption that the acquisition
cost has to be larger than the manufacturing cost is relaxed, and the acquisition
cost of the product is announced at the beginning of the first period, then the
channel coordination is restored.
Our model extends the problem that is described in a 2-period environment
by Lee et al. [8]. However, we do not examine the channel coordination nor the
supplier’s problem. We model the retailer’s problem in a multi-period environ-
ment and analyze the optimal decision rule in the existence of the price protection
policy. We also examine the effect of the protection policies to the performance
metrics of the players.
Taylor [12] explores the policy combinations that are channel coordinating
and implementable that increase the profit margins of the players in the supply
chain when compared with the decentralized case. Three channel policies which
are commonly adopted in declining price environments for channel coordination
are handled. These policies are: price protection (P), end of life returns (E)
and mid-life returns (M). The problem is modeled in a 2-period setting with two
parties where the demand observed in each period is independent. The stock out
and holding costs are negligible and all the exogenous variables are assumed to
be known by the players at the beginning of the first period. It is concluded
that under the declining price environments, EM achieves channel coordination
but does not guarantee a win-win outcome. In the use of PEM, both channel
coordination and win-win situation is attained. It is shown that if the retail
prices are constant over time, both channel coordination and a win-win situation
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is achieved by the implementation of EM.
Later, Lu et al. [10] adds rebate (R) policy to E and M which can be utilized
instead of P. In R, the supplier specifies a credit which is obtained by the retailer
for each unit sold after an acquisition cost decline. The effectiveness of these
policies, channel coordination, win-win situation conditions are explored. Lu et
al. [10] include the stock-out and holding costs to the model. Similar to the
environment of Lee et al. [8], the retailer may have a single buying opportunity
or a two buying opportunity. In the single buying opportunity, PEM or REM
guarantees a win-win outcome. The conditions under which ME coordinates the
channel are determined and discussed. In the two buying opportunity case, it
is shown that win-win policy may not exist, and that in the absence of stock-
out costs in the first period, PEM always leads to a win-win outcome. The
major contribution is that detailed procedures for determining the win-win policy
parameters under the assumption that the acquisition cost never exceeds the
retailer price are proposed.
Liu [9] explores the effects of the price protection policy on the channel per-
formance in a multi-period environment with deterministic demand structure. In
the paper, the age limit of the price protection policy is set to one and the supplier
offers full protection to the retailer. The demand is known to the retailer and
the supplier and it is decreasing in the selling price. The procurement lead time
is negligible and the supplier is ample. Also it is assumed that the market size
is non-increasing over time. The performance of the supply chain is compared
with the case where there is no protection and supplier uses price-only contract
in which the supplier announces the price and the retailer determines the order
quantity and selling price in order to satisfy the demand. The impact of the price
protection policy to the pricing decisions of the players in the supply chain is
studied in the paper. In our study, the effect of the price protection policy to the
ordering decision of the retailer and the supplier’s performance metrics are ex-
plored. Also the problem is modeled in a stochastic environment in decentralized
supply chain.
Chapter 3
Model
We consider an inventory control problem of a retailer under a single item, finite
planning horizon setting where the supplier with an ample capacity offers a price
protection policy to the retailer. The supplier can impose a limit on the price
protection credit in the sense that up to a certain portion of the inventory is
protected. The supplier sets a certain age limit for the unsold inventory at the
retailer to be reimbursed when a price decline decision is made by the supplier.
The credit and the age limits do not change throughout the horizon. We consider
three different models to treat the excess demand at the retailer: Standard Back-
order Model (SBM), Modified Backorder Model (MBM), and Lost Sales Model
(LSM). The set-up cost is assumed to be zero so that the retailer is not charged
any additional amount for placing an order to the supplier. The retailer may be
subject to a procurement lead time where the items ordered are received after a
period of lead time. The holding and shortage costs are incurred after observing
the demand and the acquisition cost is incurred at the beginning of the period. In
SBM and MBM any excess demand is backordered with a cost incurred per item
per period, whereas in LSM excess demand is lost with a cost incurred for each
unit lost. In SBM and MBM, the selling price charged to a backordered customer
is different. In SBM, at the time of the demand realization, the customers whose
demands are backordered pay the current selling price of the item but receive
their demand when the retailer’s stocks become available. Since the selling price
9
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of the item may drop in time in our problem environment, the price that has
already been charged to a backordered customer may be higher than the price
of the item at the time of the backorder clearance. The difference between the
selling prices can be interpreted as the reservation cost that is incurred by the
backordered customer for the motivation of the retailer to order more and keep
the item in his stocks. In MBM, the backordered customers pay the selling price
of the item that is effective when they receive their demand from the retailer.
In LSM, the excess demand is lost. The retailer incurs a shortage cost and the
potential profit from this customer is also lost.
The sequence of the events at any period at the retailer is as follows:
1. At the end of a period, the inventory level is reviewed and determined. If
the inventory level is less than zero, shortage costs are incurred. If the
inventory level is positive, then the excess inventory is carried to the next
period by incurring a holding cost.
2. At the beginning of the next period, if there is a reduction is the acquisition
costs and there exists protected inventory at the retailer then the supplier
reimburses the protected quantity.
3. An order is placed to by the retailer based on the current inventory position
(i.e. inventory level plus the orders placed but not received yet). The
acquisition costs are incurred.
4. The order which was placed lead time periods ago is received and the in-
ventory level is updated.
5. Demand is observed.
At the end of the planning horizon, if there is positive inventory left at the
retailer and in case a decline in the purchasing price, the unsold inventory under
protection is reimbursed by the supplier in all models. In SBM and MBM, the
excess demand at the last period of the horizon is satisfied by the retailer by
means of market clearance obligation of the retailer. However in LSM, it is lost.
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Before detailing the description of the model, we provide the notation that is
used throughout the thesis:
N = Number of periods,
a = Protection age limit of the price protection policy,
α = Price protection credit, 0 < α ≤ 1,
l = Procurement lead time between the retailer and the supplier,
Wk = Random variable denoting the demand during the k
th period,
F (wk) = The distribution function of the demand, Wk,
f(wk) = The probability distribution function of the demand, Wk,
Dk = Average demand at the k
th period,
γ = Discount factor,
bk = Unit shortage cost in period k,
hk = Unit holding cost in period k,
ck = Unit acqusition cost of the item in period k,
∆ck = ck − ck−1,
pk = Unit selling price of the item in period k
th,
∆pk = pk − pk−1,
qk = Order placed by the retailer at the beginning of the k
th period,
xk = Inventory level at the beginning of the k
th period after,
the replenishment
x˜k = State of the system at the beginning of the k
th period including the
starting inevntory level, xk, and the orders placed in the past a periods,
Jk(x˜k) = Minimum cost incurred in periods k, k + 1, ..., N in SBM, when
the system state is x˜k,
Rk(x˜k) = Maximum profit obtained in periods k, k + 1, ..., N in MBM and
LSM, when the system state is x˜k.
At the beginning of period k, we assume that ck’s and pk’s are known by the
channel partners, pk > ck, and a ≥ l
In Sections 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, we present Dynamic Programming (DP) models for
SBM, MBM and LSM respectively. Initially, we provide the common arguments
that are used in the models. In order to construct a DP model, we need to define
the state vector, x˜k, that contains the state variables. The state variables of the
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problem at any period are the orders that the retailer placed in the last a periods
and the on hand inventory at the beginning of the period. The state vector for
the price protection problem is the following:
x˜k =
(
xk, qk−a, qk−a+1, ..., qk−l, qk−l+1...qk−1
)
.
The next step is determining the evolution equation that is used to determine
the following state vector given the current state vector. The state vector x˜k
at period k, evolves into the following state vector at period k + 1 at SBM and
MBM.
x˜k+1 =
(
xk + qk−l − wk, qk−a+1, qk−a+2, ..., qk−l, qk−l+1, ..., qk−1, qk
)
.
There is a small change in the evolution equation in the LSM which is discussed
in Section 3.3.
Let vk = qk−l+1 + ... + qk−1 be the outstanding orders at the kth period after
receiving the order placed l periods ago. Thus, the total protected amount in
period k, ηk, is given by:
ηk =

α(qk−a + ...+ qk−l + vk) if xk − qk−a − ...− qk−l − vk ≥ 0
α(xk + vk) if xk − qk−a − ...− qk−l − vk < 0
0 if xk + vk ≤ 0
If xk− qk−a− ...− qk−l−vk ≥ 0, the retailer has still items unsold in his inventory
that are purchased a periods ago. The protected quantity is given by: α(qk−a +
...+ qk−l + vk) which is the maximum possible inventory under protection.
If xk − qk−a− ...− qk−l − vk < 0, the retailer has already started to sell the items
that are purchased a periods ago and in this case the inventory under protection
is: α(xk + vk).
If xk+ vk ≤ 0, there are no unsold items in the retailer’s stocks or in the pipeline
and the retailer has already sold all the inventory to the customers and therefore
the inventory under protection is zero.
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Therefore, total number of the protected items in the kth period is given by
ηk = αmin{qk−a + ...+ qk−l + vk, xk + vk}+.
3.1 Standard Backorder Model
In SBM, since the price charged to the backordered customers is always the
effective price at the time of demand realization. The ordering policy employed
does not have any impact on the total revenue generated from the customers.
Hence we can model this environment with a cost minimization objective. Let
Jk(x˜k) be the minimum cost incurred in period k when the system state is x˜k,
then
SBM-DP:
JN+l+1(x˜N+l+1) = α∆cN+l+1min{qN+l+1−a + ...+ qN , xN+l+1}+
+ cN+l+1max(−xN+l+1, 0)
Jk(x˜k) = min
qk=0
{ckqk + L(xk + qk−l)
+ α(ck − ck−1)min{qk−a + ...+ qk−l + vk, xk + vk}+
+ γEWk (Jk+1(x˜k+1))} ∀ k = N + 1, ..., N + l
Jk(x˜k) = min
qk≥0
{ckqk + L(xk + qk−l)
+ α(ck − ck−1)min{qk−a + ...+ qk−l + vk, xk + vk}+
+ γEWk (Jk+1(x˜k+1))}
∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N, FWk(0) = 1 ∀ k = 1, ..., l
where L(y) = hk
∫ y
0
(y − wk)dF (wk) + bk
∫∞
y
(wk − y)dF (wk)
In the above formulation if k − l < 0, qk−l ≡ 0. The retailer stops ordering
at the N th period but the retailer continues to observe demand in periods N +
1, N + 2, ..., N + l. Hence, even though the end of the planning horizon is N ,
the business transactions finish at the end of period (N + l). We assume that the
unit acquisition cost is the same throughout the periods N + 1, N + 2, ..., N + l
so that cN+1 = ck ∀ k = N + 1, ..., N + l.
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If the procurement lead time is zero and the protection age limit is one, the DP
is written as follows:
SBM-DP-1:
JN+1(x˜N+1) = α∆cN+1min(xN+1, qN)
+ + cN+1max(−xN+1, 0)
Jk(x˜k) = min
qk≥0
{ckqk + L(xk + qk) + α∆ckmin{xk, qk−l}+
+ γEWk (Jk+1(x˜k+1))} ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N.
In Theorem 1, for a = 1 and l = 0 we show that SBM-DP-1 can be transformed
into another DP formulation, where the inventory level attained after ordering, yk,
is the only decision variable, the optimal of this variable is found by minimizing a
convex function which is independent of the state variables and hence an order-up-
to type policy is the optimal ordering policy of the retailer under the condition
that the total holding and backorder costs at any period is greater than the
protection credit paid by the supplier to the retailer (i.e. hk + bk + α∆ck+1 ≥ 0).
According to the the order-up-to type policy, the retailer is supposed to increase
the inventory level to an optimal order-up-to point that is determined by the
minimum of a convex function, if the inventory level of the retailer is less than
the optimal-order-up-to point. Otherwise, the retailer does not order.
q∗k =
{
y∗k − xk if xk < y∗k
0 if xk ≥ y∗k
Also, optimal order-up-to level in the last period is given by
y∗N = F
−1
(
bN − cN + γcN+1
hN + bN + γα∆cN+1 + γcN+1
)
,
if total holding, backorder and selling price of the item is greater than the protec-
tion credit offered by the supplier in the last period (i.e. hN + bN + γα∆cN+1 +
γcN+1 ≥ 0).
Theorem 1 For a = 1, l = 0, if hk + bk + α∆ck+1 ≥ 0 ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N − 1, and
if k = N hN + bN + γα∆cN+1 + γcN+1 ≥ 0, then,
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(i) SBM-DP-1 is equivalent to the following problem:
JN+1(x˜N+1) = α∆cN+1min(xN+1, qN)
+ + cN+1max(−xN+1, 0)
Jk(x˜k) = min
yk≥xk
{Gk(yk)} − γα∆ck+1Φ(xk) + α∆ckmin(xk, qk−1)+ − ckxk
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k
γi+1−k
(
ci+1Di +Gi+1(y
∗
i+1)
))
+ γN+1−kcN+1DN
∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N
where
Gk(yk) = (ck − γck+1)yk + L(yk) + γ
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)
− γGk+1(y∗k+1)F (yk − y∗k+1)− γ2α∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk)dF (wk)
+ γα∆ck+1Φ(yk)∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N − 1.
GN(yN) = (cN − γcN+1)yN + L(yN) + γΦ(yN)(α∆cN+1 + cN+1) for k = N.
Φ(y) =
∫ y
0
F (t)dt, GN+1(yN+1) = 0, and
y∗k = argminyk{Gk(yk)} ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N.
(ii) Jk(x˜k) is convex in x˜k and Gk(yk) is convex in yk ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N .
(iii) Optimal ordering policy of the retailer is an order-up-to type policy that
states if the inventory level of the retailer is less than y∗k, the order quantity bring
the inventory level to yk∗, otherwise do not order. The following summarizes the
order-up-to type policy,
q∗k =
{
y∗k − xk if xk < y∗k
0 if xk ≥ y∗k
(iv) Optimal order-up-to level of the last period is:
y∗N = F
−1
(
bN + γcN+1 − cN
hN + bN + γα∆cN+1 + γcN+1
)
.
¤
CHAPTER 3. MODEL 16
If the procurement lead time is zero and the protection age limit is 2, the DP can
be written as follows:
SBM-DP-2:
JN+1(x˜N+1) = α∆cN+1min(xN+1, qN + qN−1)+ + cN+1max(−xN+1, 0)
Jk(x˜k) = min
qk≥0
{ckqk + L(xk + qk) + α∆ckmin{xk, qk−1 + qk−2}+
+ γEWk (Jk+1(x˜k+1))} ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N
In Theorem 2, We extend the results for Theorem 1 to a = 2 when l = 0.
Theorem 2 For a = 2 , l = 0, if hk + bk + γα∆ck+1 ≥ 0 ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N − 1,
and if k = N hN + bN + γα∆cN+1 + γcN+1 ≥ 0,
(i) SBM-DP-2 is equivalent to the following problem:
JN+1(x˜N+1) = α∆cN+1min(xN+1, qN + qN−1)+ + cN+1max(−xN+1, 0)
JN(x˜N) = min
yN≥xN
{GN(yN)} − γα∆cN+1Φ(xN − qN−1) + γcN+1DN
+ α∆cN min(xN , qN−1 + qN−2)+ − cNxN .
where
GN(yN) = (cN − γcN+1)yN + L(yN) + γΦ(yN)(α∆cN+1 + cN+1).
Jk(x˜k) = min
yk≥xk
{Gk(yk)} − γ2α∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xk − wk)dF (wk)
− γα∆ck+1Φ(xk − qk−1)
+ α∆ckmin(xk, qk−2 + qk−1)+ − ckxk
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k
γi+1−k
(
ci+1Di +Gi+1(y
∗
i+1)
))
+ γN+1−kcN+1DN
∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N − 1.
Gk(yk) = (ck − γck+1)yk + L(yk) + γ
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)
− γGk+1(y∗k+1)F (yk − y∗k+1)
− γ3α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk+1 − wk)dF (wk+1)dF (wk) + γα∆ck+1Φ(yk)
if k = 1, 2, ..., N − 2,
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GN−1(yN−1) = (cN−1 − γcN)yN−1 + L(yN−1) + γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
− γGN(y∗N)F (yN−1 − y∗N) + γα∆cNΦ(yN−1) ifk = N − 1.
Φ(y) =
∫ y
0
F (t)dt,
GN+1(yN+1) = 0, y
∗
N+1 = 0,
y∗k = argminyk{Gk(yk)} ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N .
(ii) Jk(x˜k) is convex in x˜k and Gk(yk) is convex in yk ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N .
(iii) Optimal ordering policy of the retailer is an order-up-to type policy. That is,
q∗k =
{
y∗k − xk if xk < y∗k
0 if xk ≥ y∗k
(iv)The order-up-to level of the last period is
y∗N = F
−1
(
bN − cN + γcN+1
hN + bN + γα∆cN+1 + γcN+1
)
.
¤
In Theorems 1 and 2, we prove that the base stock policy is optimal. According
to the base stock policy, the retailer is supposed to increase the inventory level
to an optimal order-up-to point that is determined by the minimum of a convex
function, if the inventory level of the retailer is less than the optimal-order-up-to
point. Otherwise, the retailer does not order. Also, we observe that the order-
up-to levels of the models with single protection period and double protection
period are the same for the last period. This can be the consequence of allowing
backorders. In this case no demand is lost, some of them are satisfied on time
and some of them are satisfied with a little delay and a backorder cost. Thus
the market share remains the same for the retailer. In this setting increasing the
protection period does not affect the ordering amounts but the total costs. Also,
we observe the convexity conditions for the single and double period protection is
the same. In both cases, the convexity is preserved at any intermediate period if
the total holding and backorder costs of the retailer is higher than the protection
credit offered by the supplier. That is if the protection credit offered by the
supplier is higher than the total holding and backorder costs incurred by the
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retailer, then the retailer will simply prefer no action with the customers and
the model will not be valid. Also, for the last period in order to preserve the
convexity, total holding, backorder and discounted acquisition cost of the item for
the ending period (N +1) should be grater or equal to the discounted protection
credit offered by the supplier for the ending period (N+1). Otherwise, the retailer
would choose no action with the customers and the model would be meaningless.
SBM is applicable for the products whose demand rate is high but manu-
facturing rate is low. Therefore, the customers who cannot find the product in
the market becomes willing to pay the reservation cost and wait for the product
to become available in the retailer’s stocks. Reservation cost can be considered
as the difference in the selling price of the product between the period that the
demand is observed and the period that it is satisfied. Since the acquisition cost
declines in time, reservation cost is non-negative. Modeling the environments
that includes the products like computer game consoles (e.g. Sony Play Station)
using SBM would be more meaningful. Since these products are manufactured
in limited quantity and the demand of the item depend on the popularity of the
product among the customers. Also, there is a decline in the acquisition cost of
the product, since the newer ones are prepared for the market. Therefore, the
customers are willing to pay the reservation cost for the product that they want
to have.
3.2 Modified Backorder Model
In MBM, the selling price charged to a customer whose demand is backordered
is the price that is effective at the time of the backorder clearance. The total
expected profit obtained in such environments depends on the operating policies
employed, since the selling price charged to a backordered customer may drop
in the mean time until the backorder is cleared. Hence, problem in this setting
should be modeled with a profit maximization objective. The following formula-
tion is valid for the profit to go function in the kth period:
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MBM-DP:
RN+l+1(x˜N+l+1) = −α∆cN+1min{qN+l+1−a + ...qN , xN+l+1}+
+ (pN+1 − cN+1)max(−xN+l+1, 0)
Rk(x˜k) = max
qk=0
{−ckqk + pk (max(0,min(0, xk + qk−l)− xk)
+ EWk{min(xk + qk−l,Wk)+}
)
− L(xk + qk−l)
− α(ck − ck−l)min{qk−a + ...+ qk−l−1 + vk, xk + vk}+
+ γEWk(Rk+1(x˜k+1))} ∀ k = N + 1, ..., N + l,
Rk(x˜k) = max
qk≥0
{−ckqk + pk (max(0,min(0, xk + qk−l)− xk)
+ EWk{min(xk + qk−l,Wk)+}
)
− L(xk + qk−l)
− α(ck − ck−l)min{qk−a + ...+ qk−l−1 + vk, xk + vk}+
+ γEWk(Rk+1(x˜k+1))}
∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N,
where
L(y) = hk
∫ y
0
(y − wk)dF (wk) + bk
∫ ∞
y
(wk − y)dF (wk)
FWk(0) = 1 ∀ k = 1, ..., l.
Let Uk be the money collected by the retailer at the end of the k
th period provided
that the beginning net inventory level of the retailer is xk, the inventory delivered
to the retailer’s stocks at the beginning of the kth period is qk−l, and the order
placed by the retailer after the replenishment is qk. Then we have
Uk =

pkqk−l if xk + qk−l < 0 andxk < 0
−pkxk + EWk(min(xk + qk−l,Wk)) if xk + qk−l ≥ 0 andxk < 0
pkEWk(min(xk + qk−l,Wk)) if xk + qk−l ≥ 0 andxk ≥ 0
This is exactly obtained by the following expression
pk
(
max(0,min(0, xk + qk−l)− xk) + EWk{min(xk + qk−l,Wk)+}
)
.
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For l = 0 and a = 1 we have,
MBM-DP-1:
RN+1(x˜N+1) = −α∆cN+1min(xN+1, qN)+ + (pN+1 − cN+1)max(−xN+1, 0)
Rk(x˜k) = max
qk≥0
{−ckqk + pk (max(0,min(0, xk + qk)− xk)
+ EWk{min(xk + qk,Wk)+}
)
− L(xk + qk)− α∆ckmin(xk, qk−1)+ + γEWk(Rk+1(x˜k+1))}
∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N
In Theorem 3, for a = 2 and l = 0 we show that MBM-DP-1 can be transformed
into another DP formulation, where the inventory level attained after ordering, yk,
is the only decision variable, the optimal of this variable is found by maximizing a
concave function which is independent of the state variables and hence order-up-to
type policy is optimal ordering policy for the retailer under the condition that the
total holding, backorder and selling price of the item in the k′th period is higher
than the discounted total of the protection credit that will be delivered and the
selling price of the item in the next period (i.e. (−pk+γpk+1−γα∆ck+1−hk−bk) ≤
0). According to the order-up-to type policy, the retailer is supposed to increase
the inventory level to an optimal order-up-to point if the inventory level of the
retailer is less than this point. Otherwise, the retailer does not order. More
formally, the following is valid for the order-up-to type policy:
q∗k =
{
y∗k − xk if xk < y∗k
0 if xk ≥ y∗k
Also, optimal order-up-to level in the last period is given by
y∗N = F
−1
(
bN + cN − pN − γcN+1 + γpN+1
−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γpN+1 − γcN+1 − hN − bN
)
,
if the total holding, backorder and selling price of the item is higher than the
discounted total of the protection credit that will be paid to the retailer at the
end of the horizon and the profit margin of the retailer that will be obtained from
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selling a single item to a customer (i.e. (−pN +γpN+1−γα∆cN+1−γcN+1−hN−
bN) ≤ 0).
Theorem 3 For a = 1, l = 0, if (−pk + γpk+1 − γα∆ck+1 − hk − bk) ≤ 0 ∀
k = 1, 2, ..., N−1, and if (−pN +γpN+1−γα∆cN+1−γcN+1−hN − bN) ≤ 0 then,
(i)assuming that yk = xk+qk and yk > 0, therefore max(0,min(0, xk+qk)−xk) =
max(−xk, 0)
MBM-DP-1 is equivalent to the following problem:
RN(x˜N) = max
yN≥xN
{GN(yN)}+ γα∆cN+1Φ(xN) + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)DN
+ pN max(−xN , 0) + cNxN − α∆cN min(xN , qN−1)+
where
GN(yN) = yN(−cN + pN + γcN+1 − γpN+1)
+ Φ(yN)(−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γpN+1 − γcN+1)− L(yN),
Rk(x˜k) = max
yk≥xk
{Gk(yk)}+ γα∆ck+1Φ(xk)
+ pkmax(−xk, 0)− α∆ckmin(xk, qk−1)+ − ckxk
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k
γi+1−k
(
(pi+1 − ci+1)Di +Gi+1(y∗i+1)
))
+ γN+1−kcN+1DN
∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N − 1
where
Gk(yk) = (−ck + γck+1 + pk)yk + (−pk + γpk+1 − γα∆ck+1)Φ(yk)
− L(yk) + γ
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)− γGk+1(y∗k+1)F (yk − y∗k+1)
+ γ2α∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk)dF (wk).
Φ(y) =
∫ y
0
F (t)dt,
GN+1 = 0, y
∗
N+1 = 0, xk + qk ≥ 0,
y∗k = argminyk{Gk(yk)} ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N .
(ii) Rk(x˜k) is concave in x˜k and qk−1 and Gk(yk) is concave in yk ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N .
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(iii) Optimal ordering policy of the retailer is an order-up-to type policy,
q∗k =
{
y∗k − xk if xk < y∗k
0 if xk ≥ y∗k
(iv) The optimal order-up-to level in the last period is:
y∗N = F
−1
(
bN + cN − pN − γcN+1 + γpN+1
−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γpN+1 − γcN+1 − hN − bN
)
.
¤
For a = 2 and l = 0, we have the following formulation:
MBM-DP-2:
RN+1(x˜N+1) = −α∆cN+1min(xN+1, qN + qN−1)+
+ (pN+1 − cN+1)max(−xN+1, 0)
Rk(x˜k) = max
qk≥0
{−ckqk + pk (max(0,min(0, xk + qk)− xk)
+EWk{min(xk + qk,Wk)+}
)
− L(xk + qk)− α∆ckmin{xk, qk−1 + qk−2}+
+ γEWk(Rk+1(x˜k+1))}
∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N.
In Theorem 4, we extend the results of Theorem 3 to a = 2 case.
Theorem 4 For a = 2, l = 0, if (−γα∆ck+1 + γpk+1 − pk − hk − bk) ≤ 0
∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N−1, and if k = N (−pN−γα∆cN+1+γ(pN+1−cN+1)−hN−bN) ≤ 0
then,
(i) assuming that yk = xk + qk and yk > 0, max(0,min(0, xk + qk) − xk) =
max(−xk, 0) MBM-DP-2 is equivalent to the following problem:
RN(x˜N) = max
yN≥xN
{GN(yN)}+ γα∆cN+1Φ(xN − qN−1) + pN max(−xN , 0)
+ cNxN − α∆cN min(xN , qN−1 + qN−2)+ + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)DN
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where
GN(yN) = yN(−cN + pN − γ(pN+1 − cN+1))
+ Φ(yN)(−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γ(pN+1 − cN+1))− L(yN),
RN−1(x˜N−1) = max
yN−1≥xN−1
{GN−1(yN−1)}
+ γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+ γα∆cNΦ(xN−1 − qN−2)
+ pN−1max(−xN−1, 0)− α∆cN−1min(xN−1, qN−2 + qN−3)+
+ cN−1xN−1 + γ(pN − cN)DN−1 + γ2(pN+1 − cN+1)DN + γGN(y∗N)
where
GN−1(yN−1) = (−cN−1 + γcN + pN−1)yN−1
+ (−γα∆cN + γpN − pN−1)Φ(yN−1)
− L(yN−1) + γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
− γGN(y∗N)F (yN−1 − y∗N),
Rk(x˜k) = max
yk≥xk
{Gk(yk)}
+ γ2α∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xk − wk)dF (wk)
+ γα∆ck+1Φ(xk − qk−1) + pkmax(−xk, 0)
− α∆ckmin(xk, qk−2 + qk−1)+ + ckxk
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k
γi+1−k
(
(pi+1 − ci+1)Di +Gi+1(y∗i+1)
))
+ γN+1−kcN+1DN
where
Gk(yk) = (−ck + γck+1 + pk)yk + (−γα∆ck+1 + γpk+1 − pk)Φ(yk)
− L(yk) + γ
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)
− γGk+1(y∗k+1)F (yk − y∗k+1)
+γ3α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk − wk+1)dF (wk)dF (wk+1)
}
.
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Φ(y) =
∫ y
0
F (t)dt,
GN+1 = 0, y
∗
N+1 = 0,
y∗k = argminyk{Gk(yk)} ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N .
(ii) Rk(x˜k) is concave in xk, qk−1 and qk−2 and Gk(yk) is concave in yk ∀ k =
1, 2, ..., N .
(iii) Optimal ordering policy of the retailer is a base stock policy.
(iv) The optimal order-up-to level at the last period is:
y∗N = F
−1
(
bN + cN − pN + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)
−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)− hN − bN
)
.
¤
In Theorems 3 and 4, we prove that order-up-to type policy is optimal. Also, we
observe that the order-up-to levels of the models with single protection period and
double protection period is the same, similar to SBM. This can be the consequence
of allowing backorders. The same reasoning can be applied here. We observe that
the concavity of the profit to go function is preserved in an intermediate period
if the total of the holding, backorder costs and the selling price of the item is
higher than the discounted total of the protection credit that will be delivered
and the selling price of the item for the next period (i.e. (−γα∆ck+1 + γpk+1 −
pk − hk − bk) ≤ 0 ). Also, at the end of the horizon, the concavity is preserved if
the total holding, backorder costs and selling price of the item is higher than the
discounted total of the protection credit that will be paid to the retailer at the end
of the horizon and the profit margin of the retailer that is obtained from selling a
single item to a customer (i.e. (−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γ(pN+1− cN+1)− hN − bN) ≤
0). Otherwise, transactions between the retailer and the customers would be
meaningless.
MBM is applicable for the products whose demand and manufacturing rate is
high. The customers has a lot of choices to buy the product. Therefore, they are
not willing to pay the reservation cost i.e. to be charged with the former price
of the item. In these cases, using MBM for modeling the environment is more
adequate. Most of the computer products can be considered in this set.
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3.3 Lost Sales Model
Unlike the SBM and MBM, in LSM the unsatisfied demand is lost. The retailer
incurs a shortage cost and loses profit of each item that cannot be satisfied.
In LSM, there are some changes in the model construction and the evolution
equation. Similar to the MBM, we use a maximization objective. The state
vector is given by
x˜k = (xk, qk−a, qk−a+1, ..., qk−l, qk−l+1, ..., qk−1) .
The evolved state vector for the (k + 1)st period is:
x˜k+1 = (max(0, xk + qk−l − wk), qk−a+1, qk−a+2, ..., qk−l, qk−l+1, ..., qk−1, qk) .
The reason for this change is the fact that the retailer’s net inventory level at the
beginning of any period cannot be less than zero due to lost sales. The profit to
go function of the retailer at the kth period when the system state is x˜k is given
by the following:
LSM-DP:
RN+l+1(x˜N+1) = −α∆cN+1min{qN+l+1−a + ...qN , xN+l+1}+
Rk(x˜k) = max
qk=0
{−ckqk + pkEWk (min(max(0, xk + qk−l),Wk))
− L(xk + qk−l)− α(ck − ck−1)min{qk−a + ...+ qk−l + vk, xk + vk}+
+ γEWk(Rk+1(x˜k+1))} ∀ k = N + 1, ..., N + l,
Rk(x˜k) = max
qk≥0
{−ckqk + pkEWk (min(max(0, xk + qk−l),Wk))
− L(xk + qk−l)− α(ck − ck−1)min{qk−a + ...+ qk−l + vk, xk + vk}+
+ γEWk(Rk+1(x˜k+1))} ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N,
where
L(y) = hk
∫ y
0
(y − wk)dF (wk) + bk
∫ ∞
y
(wk − y)dF (wk),
FWk(0) = 1 ∀ k = 1, ..., l.
The following DP formulations are valid for the zero lead time where the protec-
tion age limits are determined as 1 and 2 by the supplier, respectively:
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LSM-DP-1:
RN+1(x˜N+1) = −α∆cN+1min(xN+1, qN)+
Rk(x˜k) = max
qk≥0
{−ckqk + pkEWk (min(xk + qk, 0))
− L(xk + qk)− α∆ckmin(xk, qk−1)+
+ γEWk(Rk+1(x˜k+1))} ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N,
LSM-DP-2:
RN+1(x˜N+1) = −α∆cN+1min(xN+1, qN + qN−1)+
Rk(x˜k) = max
qk≥0
{−ckqk + pkEWk (min(xk + qk, 0))
− L(xk + qk)− α∆ckmin(xk, qk−1 + qk−2)+
+ γEWk(Rk+1(x˜k+1))} ∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N.
In the following theorem, we characterize the ordering decision of the last period
for a = 1, a = 2 and l = 0.
Theorem 5 For LSM-DP-1 and LSM-DP-2, optimal order-up-to level at the last
period is given by
y∗N = F
−1
(
pN − cN − bN
pN − α∆cN+1 + hN + bN
)
.
Chapter 4
Numerical Study
The objective in our numerical study is to analyze the impact of the price protec-
tion policies on the optimal replenishment behavior of the retailer and different
performance metrics of the retailer and supplier. We select the following policy
parameters and the performance metrics for our analysis.
1. Order-up-to levels: This is the optimal decision rule for a rational profit
maximizer retailer.
2. Expected profit of the retailer: Under the assumption of the existence of
rational retailer, this parameter is the outcome of the transaction.
3. Expected cost for the protected items: This cost is incurred by the supplier
and it is the result of the protection policies.
4. Expected revenue of the supplier: The revenue that the supplier generates
from the retailer.
5. Supplier’s profit: The supplier earns revenue from the products that the
retailer is ordering from the supplier and reimburses the cost difference
of the protected inventory if there is an acquisition cost decline. Supplier’s
profit is the difference between the expected revenue of the supplier and the
expected cost for the protected inventory of the retailer. The operational,
27
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manufacturing, holding, backorder and opportunity costs of the supplier are
ignored while computing the supplier’s profit.
6. Type 1 service level: Probability of no stock out during the horizon.
7. Type 2 service level: Fraction of demand satisfied directly from the shelf.
In the first part of our study, we analyze the Modified Backorder Model (MBM)
and in the second part we analyze the Lost Sales Model (LSM). We verify that
the optimal ordering policy for the retailer in MBM is order-up-to as it is also
shown in Theorems 3 and 4. Also we observe numerically that order-up-to policy
is optimal in LSM for the retailer.
For both parts of the study, we are solving a 6-period problem with zero lead
time and an ample supplier that offers the protection age limit to the retailer as
one or two. We assume that the demand is stationary during the horizon. We
explore the performance metrics’ responses under two different distributions that
are Poisson and negative binomial (NBD). We study Poisson distribution under
different means and NBD under different parameters that lead to the same mean
but different variances. We assume that the discount factor is one throughout
the horizon. Furthermore, we consider the problem parameters listed in Table
4.1 and the cost decline structures are listed in Table 4.2.
Table 4.1: Problem Parameters
Parameter Type
Cost Decline (CD) Linear, Increasing, Decreasing
Price(P) ci + 15, ci + 30, 1.15ci, 1.30ci
Backorder Cost(B) 0.10c1, 0.30c1
Holding Cost 0.10ci
Protection Age Limit(a) 0, 1, 2
Protection Credit Limit(α) 0.8, 1
Discount Factor (γ) 1
Model MBM, LSM
Demand Poisson(λ = 4), Poisson(λ = 5), Poisson(λ = 7)
NBD(2,0.4), NBD(3,0.6), NBD(4,0.8)
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Table 4.2: Cost Decline Structures
Cost Decline Acquisition Cost of Each Period
Type (CD) c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7
Linear Decline (LD) 100 90 80 70 60 50 45
Increasing Decline (ID) 100 98 94 86 70 50 45
Decreasing Decline (DD) 100 80 64 56 52 50 45
The order-up-to levels and the expected profit of the retailer are derived by
solving the dynamic programming formulation of the problem from the last period
to the first one. At the end of the horizon, if the net inventory level at the retailer
is greater than zero, the protection credit is calculated and paid to the retailer by
the supplier in both MBM and LSM. If the retailer is operating with the MBM,
the excess demand at the last period is assured to be satisfied by the retailer at
the end of the horizon. If the retailer is operating with LSM, the excess demand
at the last period is simply lost. The calculation of the expected profit of the
retailer, expected cost for the protected items, expected revenue of the supplier,
supplier’s profit, Type 1 and Type 2 service levels are done after determining
the optimal order-up-to levels and feeding them into the simulation program
that is coded in C. Each problem instance is run for 1500 replications. After
completing the replications, the average of the related costs are determined and
this process is repeated for all the problem instances we tabulated in Table 4.1.
We choose the simulation in order to calculate the performance metrics since it is
less complicated especially while computing the service levels. We double check
the expected profit of the retailer with the result we obtained in the dynamic
programming problem.
Price protection policy is costly from the supplier’s perspective since the sup-
plier promises the reimbursement of the unsold inventory in the retailer’s stocks
in case acquisition cost of the item declines. New component in the supplier’s
costs is the protection cost. Cost component reflects the cost of increasing the
availability of the product in the market (it is the cost of increasing flow rate of
the newer products in the supply channel). The protection cost for the supplier
obviously affects the supplier’s profit. It is intuitive that increasing protection
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age limit or the credit, α, results higher protection costs and higher supplier’s
revenue, however we cannot say much about the supplier’s profit as we do not
consider ever cost component of the supplier here.
4.1 Modified Backorder Model
In all instances we observe that the profit of the retailer increases as the supplier
increases the protection age limit or the credit. Table 4.3 shows the expected
retailer profit when there is no price protection, and the percentage improve-
ments on the expected retailer profit under different price protection terms when
compared with the base case. We observe some instances where the retailer can
increase his profit by 214.74% after the supplier introduces a protection policy
to the chain. Therefore, the introduction of price protection policies make the
retailer’s position better in comparison to the base case.
The minimum profit is attained by the retailer at all cost decline structures
when the retailer is operating with higher backorder cost (0.30c1) and small profit
margin (1.15ci). Therefore, even a small increase in the retailer’s profit has a
significant effect as a percent increase. As a result, maximum percent increase in
the retailer’s profit is achieved when the supplier introduces protection policies
to the channel in these cases.
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Table 4.3: Percent Increase in Retailer Profit Under Different Price Protection
Policies (Poisson(λ = 5))
Problem Retailer α = 0.8 α = 1
CD P B Profit a = 1 a = 2 a = 1 a = 2
(a=0) %inc %inc %inc %inc
LD ci+15 0.10c1 307.62 7.22 7.72 10.01 10.62
ci+30 757.62 2.93 3.13 4.06 4.31
1.15ci 182.72 14.48 15.30 19.17 20.25
1.30ci 507.82 6.03 6.33 7.72 8.27
ci+15 0.30c1 175.01 32.34 34.68 41.21 45.71
ci+30 625.01 9.05 9.71 11.53 12.79
1.15ci 56.99 100.67 108.62 129.38 144.31
1.30ci 389.51 14.78 16.18 19.27 21.58
ID ci+15 0.10c1 305.83 6.41 6.97 9.17 9.89
ci+30 755.83 2.59 2.81 3.70 4.00
1.15ci 217.10 10.86 11.68 14.78 15.80
1.30ci 578.55 4.74 5.05 6.28 6.79
ci+15 0.30c1 175.98 27.15 29.70 35.22 39.02
ci+30 625.98 7.62 8.34 9.90 10.96
1.15ci 92.64 53.82 58.69 69.83 77.93
1.30ci 459.29 11.30 12.28 14.70 16.52
DD ci+15 0.10c1 313.74 6.89 7.15 9.42 9.93
ci+30 763.74 2.82 2.93 3.86 4.08
1.15ci 152.77 16.35 17.19 22.39 23.61
1.30ci 442.98 6.39 6.68 8.62 9.16
ci+15 0.30c1 191.45 27.09 29.24 35.73 38.94
ci+30 641.45 8.08 8.72 10.66 11.62
1.15ci 36.23 150.08 161.46 197.27 214.74
1.30ci 331.12 17.14 18.39 22.48 24.60
Table 4.4 shows that the expected profit of the supplier when there is no price
protection, expected protection cost and percentage improvements on the sup-
plier’s profit under different price protection terms. The expected profit of the
supplier is calculated by taking the difference between the expected revenue of
the supplier and expected cost for the protected items.
Expected Profit of the Supplier = Expected Revenue of the Supplier
− Expected Cost for the Protected Items.
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We observe that the expected protection cost is non-decreasing in the protection
age limit and credit. However, we cannot observe such a monotonicity for the
supplier’s profit. Since it strictly depends on the problem parameters and order-
up-to levels. Also, in most of the cases the supplier is hurt from protection
policies. However, there are cases where win-win situation is observed. Therefore,
if price protection policies are managed well, both of the players in the supply
chain can be better off.
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It is obvious that the price protection policies increase the service levels of the
retailer since it motivates the retailer to order more thus leads to less backorders
or stock out occasions. In Table 4.5, we observe that both Type 1 and Type 2
service levels are non-decreasing in the protection age limit and credit. In all cost
decline structures, percent increase in the service levels are more significant if the
retailer is operating with a lower backorder cost.
In all instances, we observe that order-up-to policy is optimal and order-up-to
levels are non-decreasing in the protection age limit and credit offered by the
supplier. Also, for a given protection credit, α, we observe that the expected
profit of the retailer increases as the supplier increases the protection age limit.
In Table 4.6, the results are given for different cost decline structures. In DD we
observe a non-monotonicity in the order-up-to levels of the retailer, unlike the
other cost structures. In DD, the price is so high at the beginning of the horizon
and declines very rapidly. Therefore, the retailer tends to buy later in time.
Table 4.6: Retailer Profit and Order-up-to Levels Under Different Cost Decline
Structures (Poisson(λ = 5),bi = 0.10c1, hi = 0.10ci, pi = ci + 30)
Decline Protection Protection Order-up -to Levels Retailer
Type Policy(a) Credit(α) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 Profit
LD 0 - 4 4 4 4 4 3 757.63
1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 788.38
2 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 790.27
1 0.8 5 5 5 5 5 3 779.80
2 0.8 5 5 5 5 5 3 781.32
ID 0 - 5 4 4 4 4 3 755.83
1 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 783.82
2 1 5 5 5 5 5 3 786.04
1 0.8 5 5 5 4 5 3 775.39
2 0.8 5 5 5 5 5 3 777.09
DD 0 - 3 4 4 5 5 3 763.74
1 1 5 5 5 6 5 3 793.27
2 1 5 5 5 6 5 3 794.87
1 0.8 4 5 5 5 5 3 785.30
2 0.8 4 5 5 5 5 3 786.12
We now analyze a specific example in details, where we study the impact of the
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price protection policies to the order-up-to levels and service levels of the retailer
and the supplier’s protection cost, revenue and profit. In this example we choose
the demand distribution as Poisson with mean 5 and LD is assumed for cost
decline structure. The supplier is offering a full protection to the retailer (α = 1)
and the protection age limit is assumed to be 1 or 2. Selling price is determined
by adding a fixed mark-up (+30) to the acquisition cost. The responses of the
performance metrics is explored first of all when the backorder cost is 10% of the
highest acquisition cost and then when the backorder cost is 30% of the highest
acquisition cost.
In the presence of price protection, the retailer is encouraged to order more,
thus the order-up-to levels are non-decreasing and this is followed by less back-
order costs and more expected profit. Also, at each price decline the revenue
of the retailer is incremented by a certain amount depending on the number of
the protected items, protection credit and the decline in the acquisition cost.
When we analyze the expected profit of the retailer under different protection
age limits in Table 4.6, we see that the retailer profit increases very rapidly with
the introduction of the protection mechanism. Later on, the impact of increas-
ing the protection age limit decreases. Shifting from no protection policy to the
1-period protection policy increases the profit much more than shifting from 1-
period protection mechanism to the 2-period protection mechanism with the same
protection credits.
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Figure 4.1: Expected Protection Cost for Supplier, Type 1 and Type 2 Service
Levels of the Retailer vs Protection Age Limit (LD, Poisson(λ = 5), α = 1,
bi = 0.10c1, pi = ci + 30)
In Figures 4.1 and 4.2, the impact of price protection policy on the retailer and
supplier performance are displayed for the specific example when the backorder
cost is 10% of the highest acquisition cost. Introducing a protection mechanism to
the system increases the service levels of the retailer and increases the protection
cost and expected revenue of the supplier. Since the order-up-to levels increase,
the retailer orders more and faces less stock out occasions and incurs less back-
orders. Thus the service levels of the retailer increase. Also, expected revenue
of the supplier increases after applying the protection mechanism to the system
since the retailer orders more. However, increasing the protection age limit from
1 to 2 does not change the expected revenue of the supplier, because order-up-to
levels do not change. As expected, as the age limit of the protection policy is
increased, expected protection cost increases. However, we cannot say anything
about the supplier’s expected profit, since it strictly depends on the problem pa-
rameters. In Figure 4.2, we see that the expected profit of the supplier increases
either the protection age limit is 1 or 2 when compared with the no protection
case. However the increment is not so significant, it increase by 0.375% in the
1-period protection policy and it increases by 0.344% in the 2-period protection
case when compared to the base case where there is no protection policy offered
by the supplier. The highest supplier profit is achieved when he introduces the
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Figure 4.2: Expected Profit and Revenue for Supplier, Type 1 and Type 2 Service
Levels vs Protection Age Limit(LD, Poisson(λ = 5), α = 1, bi = 0.10c1, pi =
ci + 30)
age limit as 1. However, the highest service levels are attained when the supplier
offers the retailer 2-period protection policy.
If we set the b = 0.30c1 and analyze the performance metrics, we observe that
the service levels, protection cost and expected revenue of the supplier increase
as the age limit of the protection is increased.
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Figure 4.3: Expected Protection Cost for Supplier, Type 1 and Type 2 Service
Levels of the Retailer vs Protection Age Limit (LD, Poisson(λ = 5), α = 1,
bi = 0.30c1, pi = ci + 30)
In Figure 4.3, we observe that the increment in the protection cost when
shifting from no price protection to 1-period price protection is much more than
the increment when shifting from 1 to 2-period price protection policy. Also, the
increase in the service levels in shifting from no protection to 1-period protection
policy is much more than the increase in the service levels while shifting from
1 to 2-period protection policy. Although the protection cost increases as the
protection age limit is increased, the increment is not so significant when the age
limit is increased from 1 to 2 in comparison with the increment when the age
limit is increased from 0 to 1 by the supplier. In Figure 4.4, we observe that the
expected revenue of the supplier increases as the age limit is increased, similar
to the protection cost situation, the increment is much more when the supplier
increases the protection age limit from 0 to 1 than the case where he increases it
from 1 to 2. When we analyze the expected profit of the supplier, we see that the
maximum profit is attained when the supplier does not offer any protection policy
to the retailer. However, this case provides the worst customer service level. In
this situation, increasing the service levels of the retailer hurts the supplier very
badly.
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Figure 4.4: Expected Revenue and Profit for Supplier, Type 1 and Type 2 Service
Levels vs Protection Age Limit (LD, Poisson(λ = 5), α = 1, bi = 0.30c1, pi =
ci + 30)
We finally investigate the impact of the protection credit and demand vari-
ability in MBM. First we examine the protection credit. As we increase the
protection credit, expected profit of the retailer increases. We observe in Figure
4.5, the expected profit of the retailer is higher if he operates with 2-period pro-
tection policy with the same protection credits. Also, in Figure 4.5 we observe
that the difference in the Retailer’s profit with 1 period protection and 2 period
protection increases as the protection credit is increased.
In order to see the effect of the variance to the price protection policy, we
use the NBD with the same mean and different variances. In Table 4.7, we do
not observe a monotonic relation between the variance and the % increase in the
retailer profit.
4.2 Lost Sales Model
Table 4.8 shows the expected retailer profit when there is no protection and the
percentage profit improvements under different price protection terms in LSM.
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Figure 4.5: Expected Profit of the Retailer vs Protection Credit (LD, Poisson(λ =
5), bi = 0.10c1, pi = ci + 30)
Table 4.7: Retailer Profit Under Different Distributions (LD, bi = 0.10c1, pi =
ci + 30)
Distribution Mean Variance Retailer % Increase in Retailer Profit
Type Profit α = 0.8 α = 1
a = 1 a = 2 a = 1 a = 2
NBD(2, 0.4) 5 7.5 748.65 2.69 2.72 3.69 3.78
NBD(3, 0.6) 5 3.33 795.71 1.54 1.54 2.37 2.37
NBD(4, 0.8) 5 1.25 816.03 2.20 2.20 2.75 2.75
We observe that the retailer can increase his profit up to 6704.49% under cer-
tain problem parameters. Therefore, under price protection strategy the retailer
gets better in comparison with the base case where no protection policies are
implemented. The highest percent increase is observed in the same case with the
MBM. The same reasoning can also be applied here. Another observation is the
fact that the percent increase achieved in LSM is higher than the percent increase
achieved in MBM, since operating with LSM is more costly so the retailer gets
much better off when compared with the MBM by the tiniest improvements in
his profit.
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Table 4.8: Percent Increase in Retailer Profit Under Different Price Protection
Policies (Poisson(λ = 5))
Problem Retailer α = 0.8 α = 1
CD P B Profit a = 1 a = 2 a = 1 a = 2
(a=0) %inc %inc %inc %inc
LD ci+15 0.10c1 201.31 24.66 26.57 31.82 34.49
ci+30 585.17 10.64 11.95 14.15 15.93
1.15ci 114.36 37.30 40.67 49.69 53.90
1.30ci 396.15 14.54 15.90 18.84 21.42
ci+15 0.30c1 116.71 59.40 66.53 77.66 86.57
ci+30 519.96 16.15 17.78 20.25 22.99
1.15ci 21.29 299.95 339.04 398.20 447.07
1.30ci 319.50 25.05 27.65 31.71 35.20
ID ci+15 0.10c1 200.39 21.30 23.55 28.40 31.21
ci+30 579.81 9.80 11.09 13.01 15.11
1.15ci 143.58 26.47 29.61 36.21 40.14
1.30ci 160.86 11.18 12.52 14.40 16.81
ci+15 0.30c1 111.25 56.44 64.85 74.91 85.84
ci+30 519.25 13.93 15.80 17.96 20.43
1.15ci 49.51 118.05 135.59 157.40 181.46
1.30ci 386.49 17.85 20.37 23.26 26.41
DD ci+15 0.10c1 214.59 21.09 22.59 28.43 30.69
ci+30 600.69 10.26 11.09 13.44 14.83
1.15ci 91.63 44.74 48.03 60.44 64.62
1.30ci 343.28 16.12 17.21 21.14 23.43
ci+15 0.30c1 132.91 50.87 54.79 66.48 73.22
ci+30 542.22 14.28 15.83 18.67 20.79
1.15ci 1.37 4658.42 5017.41 6096.82 6704.49
1.30ci 270.90 27.09 29.61 35.40 38.94
Table 4.9 shows the impact of price protection policies on the supplier’s per-
formance. The supplier’s performance behaves similar to the MBM. Expected
protection cost is non-decreasing in the protection age limit and credit. How-
ever, expected protection cost is higher since order-up-to levels in LSM is higher
than the MBM. Also, in LSM supplier is observed to be hurt from introducing
protection policies to the channel in several cases.
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Table 4.10 shows the changes in the service levels due to different price pro-
tection policies under LSM. The results are similar to those in MBM. However
in LSM, the retailer prefers to operate at higher service levels since the retailer
incurs the extra opportunity cost of losing the demand in the market in the base
case where no protection policy is implemented. Therefore, percent increase in
the service levels is not so significant after introducing the protection policy to
the channel when compared with the MBM.
In all of the instances we analyzed, we observe that the order-up-to policy
is optimal. We also observe that the order-up-to levels and the expected profit
of the retailer increase as the supplier increases the protection age limit. Table
4.11 shows the optimal order-up-to levels and corresponding expected retailer
profit for a specific parameter set. We see that the order-up-to levels increase
and the retailer earns more as the supplier offers more protection. Also, in DD
we observe a non-monotonicity in the order-up-to levels of the retailer, different
from the other decline structures. In DD, the price is so high at the beginning
of the horizon and declines vary rapidly. Therefore, the retailer is prone to buy
later in time.
In Table 4.11, we provide the order-up-to levels and the expected profit of
the retailer if he operates with LSM. Similar to the MBM case, in the presence
of the price protection policy the retailer is encouraged to order more, thus the
order-up-to levels are increased and this increase is followed by less shortage costs,
less demand loss and more expected profit. Also, as the protection age limit is
increased by the supplier, more reimbursement will be gathered by the retailer in
case a price decline in the acquisition cost. All these factors increase the expected
profit of the retailer in the presence of the price protection policy in the system.
When we analyze the expected profit of the retailer under different protection ages
and with different price decline structures in Table 4.11, we see that the retailer
profit increases very rapidly with the introduction of the protection mechanism.
Later on the impact of increasing the protection period decreases. Shifting from
no protection mechanism to the 1-period protection mechanism increases the
profit more than shifting from 1-period protection mechanism to the 2-period
protection mechanism with the same protection credits like MBM.
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Table 4.11: Retailer Profit and Order-up-to Levels Under Different Cost Decline
Structures (N = 6, Demand Poisson(λ = 5), LT = 0,bi = 0.10c1, hi = 0.10ci,
pi = ci + 30)
Decline Protection Protection Order-Up-To Levels Retailer
Type Age Limit(a) Credit(α) S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 Profit
LD 0 0 6 6 6 6 6 4 585.17
1 1 7 7 7 7 7 5 667.99
2 1 7 7 7 7 7 5 678.39
1 0.8 6 7 7 7 7 4 647.44
2 0.8 7 7 7 7 7 4 655.08
ID 0 0 7 6 6 6 5 4 579.81
1 1 7 7 7 7 7 5 655.23
2 1 7 7 7 7 7 5 667.40
1 0.8 7 7 6 6 6 4 636.64
2 0.8 7 7 7 7 7 4 644.12
DD 0 0 5 6 6 7 7 4 600.69
1 1 6 7 7 8 7 5 681.44
2 1 7 7 7 8 7 5 689.78
1 0.8 6 7 7 7 7 4 662.34
2 0.8 6 7 7 7 7 4 667.27
If we compare the order-up-to levels with the MBM, under the same operating
parameters, we observe that although the order up to levels in the LSM is greater
than the MBM model, the profit of the retailer in the LSM is less than that in the
MBM model. This is because the market share of the retailer is preserved in the
MBM model and all the demand is satisfied on time or with a delay. However,
in the LSM, excess demand is lost and the retailer incurs shortage cost and loses
profit for each demand that cannot be satisfied.
Now, we return to the example in which we investigate the impact of the
price protection policy to the retailer’s and supplier’s performance. We consider
the same case with the MBM. Figure 4.6 shows that the protection cost and the
service levels of the retailer increase as the protection age limit is increased. Since
the order-up-to levels increase with the introduction of the protection mechanism
to the channel. However shifting from 1 to 2-period protection policy does not
increase the protection cost as much as shifting from no protection to 1-period
protection policy. Since the order-up-to levels do not change when the supplier
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Figure 4.6: Expected Protection Cost for Supplier, Type 1 and Type 2 Service
Levels of the Retailer vs Protection Age Limit (Linear Cost Decline, Demand
Poisson(λ = 5), α = 1, bi = 0.10c1, hi = 0.10ci, pi = ci + 30)
offers 2-period protection policy instead of 1-period protection policy to the re-
tailer. Also, the service levels increase as the supplier introduce a 1-period price
protection policy to the channel, however the increase in the service levels are
not so significant when he increase the protection age limit from 1 to 2.
In Figure 4.7, we observe that the expected revenue of the supplier increases
as he offers 1-period protection policy to the channel, but it does not change
if he increases the protection age limit from 1 to 2. This is because the order-
up-to levels are the same when the age limit is 1 or 2. With these problem
parameters, maximum profit is gathered by the supplier when the protection age
limit is 1. Introducing a price protection policy whose age limit is 1 increases
both the supplier’s profit margin and the retailer’s service levels. Therefore, both
players of the channel gets better when the protection policy with an age limit
1 is applied. However shifting from 1-period protection policy to the 2-period
protection policy decreases the supplier’s profit. That is because the order-up-to
levels do not change, the expected revenue of the supplier stays the same and the
protection cost increases, thus the supplier’s profit decreases. Similar observations
are made for Type 1 and 2 service levels.
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Figure 4.7: Expected Revenue and Profit for Supplier, Type 1 and Type 2 Service
Levels of the Retailer vs Protection Age Limit (LD, Poisson(λ = 5), α = 1,
bi = 0.10c1, hi = 0.10ci, pi = ci + 30)
If we set the shortage cost to the 30% of the largest acquisition cost, we obtain
Figures 4.8 and 4.9 in which the protection cost, expected revenue of the supplier
and the service levels of the retailer can be observed. Similarly, the protection
cost and the service levels increase as the protection age limit is increased by
the supplier. Since the order-up-to levels increase, the retailer loses less demand
and incurs less shortage cost. Shifting from no protection policy to the 1-period
protection policy increases the Type 1 and Type 2 service levels by 5.98% and
2.13 % respectively and increasing the protection age limit from 1 to 2 increases
the the Type 1 and Type 2 service levels by 3.95% and 1.30% respectively.
In Figure 4.9, we observe that the expected revenue of the supplier increases
as the supplier increases the protection age limit, since the order-up-to levels
increase as the age limit is increased by the supplier. However, the highest profit
is achieved by the supplier when he does not offer any protection policy to the
channel. The least profit is obtained by the supplier when the supplier offers a
1-period protection policy to the channel. The expected profit of the supplier
decreases by 1.43%, Type 1 and Type 2 service levels increase by 5.98% and
2.13%, respectively, when the supplier increases the protection age limit from 0
to 1. Also, the expected profit of the supplier decreases by 0.38%, type 1 and
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Figure 4.8: Expected Protection Cost for Supplier, Type 1 and Type 2 Service
Levels of the Retailer vs Protection Age Limit (LD, Poisson(λ = 5), α = 1,
bi = 0.30c1, hi = 0.10ci, pi = ci + 30)
type 2 service levels increase by 10.17% and 3.51%, respectively, when the supplier
increases the protection age limit from 1 to 2. Therefore, in this case the supplier
loses 0.38% on profits in return for a 10.17% and 3.51 % increases in the service
levels of the retailer if he offers 2-period protection policy.
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Figure 4.9: Expected Revenue and Profit for Supplier, Type 1 and Type 2 Service
Levels of the Retailer vs Protection Age Limit (LD,Poisson(λ = 5), α = 1,
bi = 0.30c1, hi = 0.10ci, pi = ci + 30)
Finally we explore the impact of the protection credit and the variance to
the retailer’s performance. As we increase the protection credit, expected profit
for the retailer increases similar to the MBM. In Figure 4.10, we observe that
the difference in the retailer’s profit with 1 and 2-period protection increases as
the protection credit is increased, since increasing the protection credit, α, has a
more significant effect on the expected profit of the retailer when the protection
age limit is 2.
In Table 4.12, we observe the impact of the variance to the retailer’s profit
under different price protection terms. If the variance is increased the percent
increase in the retailer profit after implementing the price protection strategy
increases. For this case, we can conclude that the retailer benefits more from
the price protection policy when there is a higher variability in demand. Percent
increases in LSM, are more than the percent increases in the MBM. Therefore,
applying the price protection strategies in an LSM environment is more effective
from the retailer’s perspective.
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Figure 4.10: Expected Profit of the Retailer vs Protection Credit (LD,
Poisson(λ = 5), bi = 0.30c1, pi = ci + 30)
Table 4.12: Retailer Profit Under Different Distributions (LD, bi = 0.10c1, pi =
ci + 30)
Distribution Mean Variance Retailer % Increase in Retailer Profit
Type Profit α = 0.8 α = 1
a=1 a=2 a=1 a=2
NBD(2, 0.4) 5 7.5 517.96 13.17 14.82 17.21 19.76
NBD(3, 0.6) 5 3.33 642.13 8.55 8.58 11.14 11.32
NBD(4, 0.8) 5 1.25 742.25 4.54 4.54 6.14 6.14
Chapter 5
Conclusion
In this thesis, we consider a single item, multi period, finite horizon inventory
problem of a retailer who faces a stochastic demand and whose orders are fulfilled
by an ample supplier. The selling price and the manufacturing costs of the
product is decreasing in time, therefore the retailer is under risk of buying high
and selling low. In order to motivate the retailer to order more, the supplier offers
him a price protection policy whose age limit and credit are determined at the
beginning of the planning horizon. In the study, the retailer’s problem where the
supplier offers a price protection policy is modeled in three different ways based
on how the excess demand is treated. The first one is the Standard Backorder
Model (SBM), the second one is the Modified Backorder Model (MBM), and the
third one is the Lost Sales Model (LSM). It is proven that the base stock policy
is optimal for the retailer if he is operating with SBM or MBM. It is shown
that the order-up-to levels are non-decreasing and the retailer is better of as the
supplier offers more protection in MBM and LSM. Increasing the order-up-to
levels for the retailer results higher service levels in the retailer, the service levels
of the retailer is verified to be non-decreasing in the protection age limit and the
protection credit.
The impact of the price protection policy to the supplier is also explored.
It is shown numerically that the expected protection cost and expected revenue
are non-decreasing in the protection age limit and credit. However, we observe
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that the expected supplier’s profit does not show a monotonic behavior as the
protection credit or age limit increases. The relation strictly depends on the
problem parameters. Although there exists cases where the profit of the both
players increases with the price protection policy, in most of the cases the supplier
may be hurt from the price protection policy.
Our study is the first study that investigates the outcomes of the price protec-
tion policy to the retailer in a stochastic demand and multi period environment.
The analytical results that have been derived for the optimal ordering decision
of the retailer are obtained for SBM and MBM for an age limit of 1 or 2. The
impact of the price protection policy to the performance metrics of the supplier
is numerically studied.
Future research can extend the analysis in many ways. First of all, optimal
ordering policy of the retailer can be derived for a general protection age limit.
A second direction could be to incorporate set-up costs for ordering. Also, we
can study the circumstances under which price protection is pareto improving or
coordinates the channel in a more detailed way under a multi period setting. In
the model, prices could be the function of time and the protection age limit could
be dynamic. The assumption that states a ≥ l could be relaxed and the response
of the model can be explored.
Bibliography
[1] S. Burke. Capellas: Hp to reduce price protection, along with inventory.
Computer Reseller News, 2002.
[2] G. Callioni, X. de Montgros, R. Slagmulder, L. N. van Wassenhove, and
L. Wright. Inventory-driven costs. Harvard Business Review, March 2005.
[3] A. J. Clark and H. Scarf. Optimal policies for a multi echelon inventory
problem. Management Science, 50(12):1782–1790, 1959.
[4] A. Federgruen and A. Heching. Combined pricing and inventory control
under uncertainty. Operations Research, 47:454–475, 1997.
[5] A. Federgruen and A. Heching. Multilocation combined pricing and inven-
tory control. Manufacturing and Service Operations Management, 4:275–295,
2002.
[6] S. Gavirneni. Periodic review inventory control with fluctuating purchasing
costs. Operations Research Letters, 32:374–379, 2004.
[7] Cattani K., W. Gilland, H. S. Heese, and J. Swaminatham. Boilingfrogs:
pricing strategies for a manufacturer adding a direct channel that competes
with the traditional channel. The Kenan-Flagler Business School Working
Paper. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2005.
[8] H. L. Lee, V. Padmanabhan, T. A. Taylor, and S. Whang. Price protection in
the personel computer industry. Management Science, 46(4):467–482, 2000.
54
BIBLIOGRAPHY 55
[9] Y. Liu. Supply Chain Management through Price Commitment Policies. Phd,
University of Cincinnati, University of Cincinnati Business Administration
Department, 11 2005.
[10] X. Lu, J. Song, and A. Regan. Rebate, returns and price protection policies
in channel coordination. IIE Transactions, 39:111–124, February 2007.
[11] J. O’Heir. An inventory of seamless teamwork. Computer Reseller News, 82,
September 22 1997.
[12] T. A. Taylor. Channel coordination under price protection, midlife re-
turns and end-of-life returns in dynamic markets. Management Science,
47(9):1220–1234, 2001.
[13] M. Vizard and E. F. Moltzen. Crn interview: Paul tufano, maxtor. Computer
Reseller News, January 16 2004.
[14] Y. Wang. Inventory systems with decreasing purchasing costs. School of
Management University of Texas at Dallas, 2006.
[15] C. Zarley. Apple postpones new price protection plan. Computer Reseller
News, page 8, January 3 1994.
[16] C. Zarley and J. Bliss. Channel resistant to new compaq terms. Computer
Reseller News, page 208, June 23 1997.
Appendix A
Proof of Theorems
Proof of Theorem 1: We need the following Lemmas in order to prove Theorem
1. Before stating the Lemmas, recall that the F (w) is defined as the cdf of the
non-negative r.v. W which denotes the stochastic demand and E(W ) = D and
Φ(y) =
∫ y
0
F (t)dt.
Lemma 1
∫ y
0
tdF (t) = yF (y)− Φ(y).
Proof:By integration by parts:∫ y
0
tdF (t) =
(
u = t du = dt
v = F (t) dv = dF (t)
)
= tF (t) |y0 −
∫ y
0
F (t)dt
= yF (y)− Φ(y)
¤
Lemma 2
∫∞
y
(w − y)dF (w) = D − y + Φ(y).
∫ ∞
y
(w − y)dF (w) =
∫ ∞
y
wdF (w)− y(1− F (y)) = D −
∫ y
0
wdF (w)− y(1− F (y))
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By using Lemma 1, we can write the above equation in the following way:∫ ∞
y
(w − y)dF (t) = D − (yF (y)− Φ(y))− y + yF (y) = D − y + Φ(y).
¤
Lemma 3 For y − x > 0, ∫ y
0
min(y − w, y − x)dF (w) = Φ(y)− Φ(x).
Proof:∫ y
0
min(y − w, y − x)dF (w) =
∫ x
0
(y − x)dF (w) +
∫ y
x
(y − w)dF (w)
= yF (y)− xF (x)−
∫ y
x
wdF (w)
= yF (y)− xF (x)−
(∫ y
0
wdF (w)−
∫ x
0
wdF (w)
)
By using Lemma 1,∫ y
0
min(y − w, y − x)dF (w) = yF (y)− xF (x)− (yF (y)− Φ(y)− xF (x) + Φ(x))
= Φ(y)− Φ(x).
¤
Lemma 4
∫∞
0
(y − w)dF (w) = y −D.
Proof: ∫ ∞
0
(y − w)dF (w) = y −
∫ ∞
0
wdF (w) = y −D.
¤
We prove by induction and begin with solving the problem from the last period
and proceeding backwards. The following state vectors are valid for the N th and
(N + 1)st periods:
x˜tN =
(
xN
qN−1
)
x˜tN+1 =
(
xN + qN −WN
qN
)
=
(
yN−1 −WN−1
yN−1 − xN−1
)
.
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Also, cost-to-go function at the last period, JN(x˜N), is in the following form:
JN(x˜N) = min
qN≥0
{cNqN + L(xN + qN) + γα∆cN+1EWN{min(qN , xN + qN −WN)+}
+ γcN+1EWN{max(WN − xN − qN , 0)}+ α∆cN{min(xN , qN−1)}+}.
In terms of yN , JN(x˜N) can be written as,
JN(x˜N) = min
yN≥xN
{cNyN + L(yN) + γα∆cN+1EWN{min(yN − xN , yN −WN)}+
+ γcN+1EWN{max(WN − yN , 0)}}+ α∆cN{min(xN , qN−1)}+ − cNxN .
Let
G˜N(yN |xN) = cNyN + L(yN) + γα∆cN+1EWN{min(yN − xN , yN −WN)}+︸ ︷︷ ︸
A
+ γcN+1EWN{max(WN − yN , 0)}︸ ︷︷ ︸
B
.
By using Lemma 3, we can write A as follows:
A =
∫ yN
0
min(yN − xN , yN − wN)dF (wN) = Φ(yN)− Φ(xN).
By using Lemma 2, B can be written as:
B =
∫ ∞
yN
(wN − yN)dF (wN) = DN − yN + Φ(yN)
After all these calculations the G˜N(yN |xN) will be the following:
G˜N(yN |xN) = cNyN + L(yN) + γα∆cN+1(Φ(yN)− Φ(xN))
+ γcN+1(DN − yN + Φ(yN))
= (cN − γcN+1)yN + L(yN) + γΦ(yN)(α∆cN+1 + cN+1) + γcN+1DN
− γα∆cN+1Φ(xN).
Therefore,
JN(x˜N) = min
yN≥xN
{GN(yN)}+ γcN+1DN − γα∆cN+1Φ(xN)
+ α∆cN{min(xN , qN−1)}+ − cNxN
where,
GN(yN) = (cN − γcN+1)yN + L(yN) + γΦ(yN)(α∆cN+1 + cN+1).
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In order to conclude that GN(yN) is convex in yN , we need to check the second
order condition.
∂GN(yN)
∂yN
= (cN − γcN+1) + (hN + bN)F (yN)− bN + γF (yN)(α∆cN+1 + cN+1),
∂GN(yN)
2
∂2yN
= f(yN)(hN + bN + γα∆cN+1 + γcN+1).
Therefore, if (hN+bN+γα∆cN+1+γcN+1) ≥ 0, GN(yN) is convex in yN . GN(yN)
attains the minimum value at y∗N which can be found by,
∂GN(yN)
∂yN
= (cN −γcN+1)+(hN + bN)F (yN)− bN +γF (yN)(α∆cN+1+cN+1) = 0.
Then,
F (y∗N) =
bN + γcN+1 − cN
hN + bN + γα∆cN+1 + γcN+1
.
And optimal order-up-to level for the N th period is:
y∗N = F
−1
(
bN + γcN+1 − cN
hN + bN + γα∆cN+1 + γcN+1
)
.
In order to show that JN(x˜N) is convex in x˜N , we have to prove that it is convex
in xN and qN−1. For this purpose, we have to calculate the Hessian of JN(x˜N)
and check if it is positive-definite or not.
H(JN(x˜N) =
[
∂2J(x˜N )
∂xN 2
∂2J(x˜N )
∂xN∂qN−1
∂2J(x˜N )
∂qN−1∂xN
∂2J(x˜N )
∂qN−12
]
∂2JN(x˜N)
∂xN 2
=
∂
∂xN
(−γα∆cN+1F (xN)) = −γα∆cN+1f(xN) > 0
∂2JN(q˜N−1)
∂qN−12
=
∂2JN(x˜N)
∂xN∂qN−1
=
∂2JN(x˜N)
∂qN−1∂xN
= 0
In order to understand H((JN(x˜N)) is positive definite we have to find out if
ztH((JN(x˜N))z > 0 for all z ∈ <2 > 0 z = (u1 u2)t,
ztH((JN(x˜N))z =
[
u1 u2
] [ −γα∆cN+1f(xN) 0
0 0
][
u1
u2
]
= − γα∆cN+1f(xN)u21 ≥ 0
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since ∆cN+1 ≤ 0. Thus JN(x˜N) is convex in qN−1 and xN .
For the (N − 1)st period, the state vectors for the (N − 1)st and the N th
periods and the cost-to-go function can be written as follows:
x˜tN−1 =
(
xN−1
qN−2
)
x˜tN =
(
xN−1 + qN−1 − wN−1
qN−1
)
=
(
yN−1 − wN−1
yN−1 − xN−1
)
,
JN−1(x˜N−1) = min
yN−1≥xN−1
{cN−1yN−1 + L(yN−1) + γEWN−1{JN(x˜N)}}
+ α∆cN−1{min(xN−1, qN−2)}+ − cN−1xN−1.
The cost-to-go function for the N th period in terms of GN(yN) is:
JN(x˜N) =

GN(yN−1 −WN−1)
−γα∆cN+1Φ(yN−1 −WN−1)
+α∆cN min(yN−1 −WN−1, yN−1 − xN−1)
−cN(yN−1 −WN−1) + γcN+1DN if yN−1 −WN−1 ≥ 0
and y∗N ≤ yN−1 −WN−1
GN(y
∗
N)− γα∆cN+1Φ(yN−1 −WN−1)
+α∆cN min(yN−1 −WN−1, yN−1 − xN−1)
−cN(yN−1 −WN−1) + γcN+1DN if y∗N ≥ yN−1 −WN−1 ≥ 0
GN(y
∗
N)− γα∆cN+1Φ(yN−1 −WN−1)
−cN(yN−1 −WN−1) + γcN+1DN if yN−1 −WN−1 < 0
And we have
EWN−1{JN(x˜N)} =
∫ ∞
0
JN(x˜N)dF (wN−1)
=
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+
∫ ∞
yN−1−y∗N
GN(y
∗
N)dF (wN−1)
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− γα∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+ α∆cN
∫ yN−1
0
min(yN−1 − wN−1, yN−1 − xN−1)dF (wN−1)
− cN
∫ ∞
0
(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1) + γcN+1DN .
By the use of Lemmas 3 and 4:
EWN−1{JN(x˜N)} =
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+
∫ ∞
yN−1−y∗N
GN(y
∗
N)dF (wN−1)
− γα∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+ α∆cN (Φ(yN−1)− Φ(xN−1))
− cN(yN−1 −DN−1) + γcN+1DN
=
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+GN(y
∗
N)−GN(y∗N)F (yN−1 − y∗N)
− γα∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+ α∆cNΦ(yN−1)− α∆cNΦ(xN−1)
− cNyN−1 + cNDN−1 + γcN+1DN .
The cost-to-go function for the (N − 1)st period is the following:
JN−1(x˜N−1) = min
yN−1≥xN−1
{(cN−1 − γcN)yN−1 + L(yN−1)
+ γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
− γGN(y∗N)F (yN−1 − y∗N)
− γ2α∆cN+1
∫ +∞
0
Φ(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+ γα∆cNΦ(yN−1)} − γα∆cNΦ(xN−1)
+ γcNDN−1 + γ2cN+1DN + γGN(y∗N)
+ α∆cN−1{min(xN−1, qN−2)}+ − cN−1xN−1.
Hence
JN−1(x˜N−1) = min
yN−1≥xN−1
{GN−1(yN−1)}
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− γα∆cNΦ(xN−1) + γcNDN−1 + γ2cN+1DN + γGN(y∗N)
+ α∆cN−1{min(xN−1, qN−2)}+ − cN−1xN−1,
where
GN−1(yN−1) = (cN−1 − γcN)yN−1 + L(yN−1)
+ γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
− γGN(y∗N)F (yN−1 − y∗N)
− γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+ γα∆cNΦ(yN−1).
Next we need to show that GN−1(yN−1) is convex in yN−1 so need to check the
second order condition. Recall the Leibnitz Rule.
Leibnitz Rule
∂
∂z
∫ β(z)
α(z)
f(x, z)dx =
∫ β(z)
α(z)
∂f
∂z
dx+ f(β(z), z)
∂β(z)
∂z
− f(α(z), z)∂α(z)
∂z
.
∂GN−1(yN−1)
∂yN−1
= (γcN − cN−1) + (hN−1 + bN−1)F (yN−1)− bN−1
+ γGN(y
∗
N)f(yN−1 − y∗N)
+ γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
G
′
N(yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1
− γGN(y∗N)f(yN−1 − y∗N)
− γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
F (yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1
+ γα∆cNF (yN−1)
= (cN−1 − γcN) + (hN−1 + bN−1 + γα∆cN)F (yN−1)− bN−1
+ γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
G
′
N(yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1
− γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
F (yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1
∂2GN−1(yN−1)
∂y2N−1
= (hN−1 + bN−1 + γα∆cN)f(yN−1)
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+ γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
G
′′
N(yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1
+ γG
′
N(y
∗
N)f(yN−1 − y∗N)
− γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
f(yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1
where, G
′
N and G
′′
N are the first and second derivatives of GN with respect to yN
respectively. Note that G
′
N(y
∗
N) = 0. Since GN(yN) is convex wrt yN , G
′′
N(yN) ≥
0. Therefore G
′′
N(yN−1−wN−1) is nonnegative. Also since f is a pdf,
∫∞
0
f(yN−1−
wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1 ≥ 0. These all make
∂2GN−1(yN−1)
∂y2N−1
≥ 0
and thus convex in yN−1 if (hN−1 + bN−1 + γα∆cN) ≥ 0.
In order to understand H(JN−1(x˜N−1)) is positive definite we have to find out if
z∗H(JN−1(x˜N−1))z > 0 for all z ∈ <2 > 0 z = (u1 u2)t
ztH((JN−1(x˜N−1))z =
[
u1 u2
] [ −γα∆cNf(xN−1) 0
0 0
][
u1
u2
]
= − γα∆cNf(xN−1)u21 ≥ 0
Therefore, JN−1(x˜N−1) is convex in xN−1 and qN−2 since ∆cN ≤ 0. Up to now,
we show that (i) and (ii) hold for the N th and (N − 1)st periods. Also we show
that (iv) holds. Part (iii) follows from the convexity of the G(.) functions. From
the induction hypothesis, assume that (i) and (ii) holds for periods k + 1, k +
2, ..., N . For the kth and the (k+1)st periods we have the following state vectors
respectively:
x˜tk =
(
xk
qk−1
)
x˜tk+1 =
(
xk + qk −Wk
qk
)
=
(
yk −Wk
yk − xk
)
.
Cost-to-go function at the kth period is:
Jk(x˜k) = min
yk≥xk
{ckyk + L(yk) + γEWk{Jk+1(x˜k+1)}}+ α∆ck{min(xk, qk−1)}+
− ckxk.
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By inductive assumption,
Jk+1(x˜k+1) = min
yk+1≥xk+1
{Gk+1(yk+1)} − γα∆ck+2Φ(xk+1)
+ α∆ck+1{min(xk+1, qk)}+ − ck+1xk+1
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k+1
γi+1−k
(
ci+1Di +Gi+1(y
∗
i+1)
))
+ γN+1−k−1cN+1DN .
Expected cost-to-go function in the kth period,
EWk{Jk+1(x˜k+1)} =
∫ ∞
0
Jk+1(x˜k+1)dF (wk)
=
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)
+
∫ ∞
yk−y∗k+1
Gk+1(y
∗
k+1)dF (wk)
− γα∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk)dF (wk)
+ α∆ck+1
∫ yk
0
min(yk − wk, yk − xk)dF (wk)
− ck+1
∫ ∞
0
(yk − wk)dF (wk)
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k+1
γi+1−k
(
ci+1Di +Gi+1(y
∗
i+1)
))
+ γN−kcN+1DN .
From Lemmas 3 and 4 we can simplify the above equation in the following way:
EWk{Jk+1(x˜k+1)} =
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)
+Gk+1(y
∗
k+1)−Gk+1(y∗k+1)F (yk − y∗k+1)
− γα∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk)dF (wk)
+ α∆ck+1(Φ(yk)− Φ(xk))
− ck+1(yk −Dk) +
(
i=N−1∑
i=k+1
γi−k
(
ci+1Di +Gi+1(y
∗
i+1)
))
+ γN−kcN+1DN
=
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)−Gk+1(y∗k+1)F (yk − y∗k+1)
− γα∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk)dF (wk) + α∆ck+1Φ(yk)− ck+1yk
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− α∆ck+1Φ(xk) + ck+1Dk +Gk+1(y∗k+1)
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k+1
γi−k
(
ci+1Di +Gi+1(y
∗
i+1)
))
+ γN−kcN+1DN .
Cost-to-go function at the kth period in terms of Gk is the following:
Jk(x˜k) = min
yk≥xk
{Gk(yk)} − γα∆ck+1Φ(xk) + α∆ck{min(xk, qk−1)}+ − ckxk
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k
γi−k+1
(
ci+1Di +Gi+1(y
∗
i+1)
))
+ γN−k+1cN+1DN
where
Gk(yk) = (ck − γck+1)yk + L(yk) + γ
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wN−2)
− γGk+1(y∗k+1)F (yk − y∗k+1)− γ2α∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk)dF (wk)
+ γα∆ck+1Φ(yk).
The convexity of the Gk(yk) in yk is shown similar to the (N−1)st period. Finally
we have,
z∗H((Jk(x˜k))z =
[
u1 u2
] [ −γα∆ck+1f(xk) 0
0 0
][
u1
u2
]
= − γα∆ck+1f(xk)u21 ≥ 0,
since ∆ck+1 ≤ 0. Thus Jk(x˜k) is convex in xk and qk−1 and order-up-to policy is
optimal for the retailer.
¤
Proof of Theorem 2: Similarly, we prove by induction. The state vectors for
the N th and (N + 1)st periods and the cost-to-go function of the N th period are
the following:
x˜tN =

xN
qN−2
qN−1

x˜tN+1 =

xN + qN − wN
qN−1
qN
 =

yN − wN
qN−1
yN − xN
 ,
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THEOREMS 66
JN(x˜N) = min
qN≥0
{cNqN + LN(xN + qN) + α∆cN{min(xN , qN−2 + qN−1)+}
+ γα∆cN+1EWN{min(xN + qN −WN , qN−1 + qN)+}
+ γcN+1EWN{max(WN − xN − qN , 0)}}
= min
yN≥xN
{cNyN + LN(yN)
+ γα∆cN+1EWN{min(yN −WN , qN−1 + yN − xN)+}
+ γcN+1EWN{max(WN − yN , 0)}}+ α∆cN{min(xN , qN−1 + qN−2)}+
− cNxN .
Let I = EWN{min(yN − WN , qN−1 + yN − xN)+} and II = EWN{max(WN −
yN , 0)}}. Then,
I =
∫ xN−qN−1
0
(yN + qN−1 − xN)dF (wN) +
∫ yN
xN−qN−1
(yN − wN)dF (wN)
= (yN + qN−1 − xN)F (xN − qN−1) + yN (F (yN)− F (xN − qN−1))
−
∫ yN
xN−qN−1
wNdF (wN)
= yNF (xN − qN−1) + (qN−1 − xN)F (xN − qN−1)
+ yNF (yN)− yNF (xN − qN−1)
−
(∫ yN
0
wNdF (wN)−
∫ xN−qN−1
0
wNdF (wN)
)
.
By using Lemma 1, I will be obtained as: I = Φ(yN)− Φ(xN − qN−1)
By using Lemma 4, II will be obtained as: II = DN − yN + Φ(yN)
Therefore, cost-to-go function in the N th period is:
JN(x˜N) = min
yN≥xN
{cNyN + L(yN) + α∆cN{min(xN , qN−1 + qN−2)+}
+ γα∆cN+1(Φ(yN)− Φ(xN − qN−1))
+ γcN+1(DN − yN + Φ(yN))} − cNxN
= min
yN≥xN
{(cN − γcN+1)yN + L(yN) + γΦ(yN)(α∆cN+1 + cN+1)}
− γα∆cN+1Φ(xN − qN−1) + γcN+1DN
+ α∆cN{min(xN , qN−1 + qN−2)+ − cNxN .
Cost-to-go function in terms of GN(yN) is the following:
JN(x˜N) = min
yN≥xN
{GN(yN)} − γα∆cN+1Φ(xN − qN−1) + γcN+1DN
+ α∆cN min(xN , qN−1 + qN−2)+ − cNxN
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where,
GN(yN) = (cN − γcN+1)yN + L(yN) + γΦ(yN)(α∆cN+1 + cN+1).
We check the second order condition for convexity.
∂GN(yN)
∂yN
= (cN − γcN+1) + (hN + bN)F (yN)− bN
+ γF (yN)(α∆cN+1 + cN+1),
∂GN(yN)
2
∂2yN
= f(yN)(hN + bN + γα∆cN+1 + cN+1).
If (hN + bN + γα∆cN+1 + γcN+1) ≥ 0, f(yN)(hN + bN + γα∆cN+1 + γcN+1) ≥ 0.
Therefore GN(yN) is convex in yN . And, order-up-to level for the N
th can be
found by,
∂GN(yN)
∂yN
= (cN − γcN+1) + (h+ b)F (yN)− b+ F (yN)(α∆cN+1 + cN+1) = 0,
F (y∗N) =
bN − cN + γcN+1
hN + bN + γα∆cN+1 + γcN+1
,
y∗N = F
−1
(
bN − cN + γcN+1
hN + bN + γα∆cN+1 + γcN+1
)
.
In order to show the convexity of JN(x˜N), we need to show that the Hessian
Matrix of JN is positive definite. The Hessian Matrix:
H(JN(x˜N)) =

∂2JN (x˜N )
∂xN 2
∂2JN (x˜N )
∂xN∂qN−1
∂2JN (x˜N )
∂xN∂qN−2
∂2JN (x˜N )
∂qN−1∂xN
∂2JN (x˜N )
∂qN−12
∂2JN (x˜N )
∂qN−1∂qN−2
∂2JN (x˜N )
∂qN−2∂xN
∂2JN (x˜N )
∂qN−2∂qN−1
∂2JN (x˜N )
∂qN−22
 .
∂2JN(x˜N))
∂xN 2
=
∂2JN(x˜N)
∂qN−12
= −γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1),
∂2JN(x˜N))
∂xN∂qN−1
=
∂2JN(x˜N))
∂qN−1∂xN
= γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1),
∂2JN(x˜N))
∂xN∂qN−2
=
∂2JN(x˜N))
∂qN−1∂qN−2
=
∂2JN(x˜N))
∂qN−2∂xN
=
∂2JN(x˜N))
∂qN−2∂qN−1
=
∂2JN(x˜N))
∂qN−22
= 0.
HN = H(JN(x˜N))) =

−γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1) γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1) 0
γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1) −γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1) 0
0 0 0

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Assume u1 ≥ 0, u2 ≥ 0, u3 ≥ 0 and z = (u1 u2 u3)t . The Hessian is:
ztHNz = −γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1)(u1 − u2)2 ≥ 0,
since ∆cN+1 ≥ 0. Therefore JN(x˜N) is convex in xN , qN−2 and qN−1.
If we continue to solve the problem for the (N − 1)st period we obtain the
following state vectors for the (N − 1)st and N th and cost-to-go function for the
(N − 1)st period:
x˜tN−1 =

xN−1
qN−3
qN−2

x˜tN =

xN−1 + qN−1 − wN−1
qN−2
qN−1
 =

yN−1 − wN−1
qN−2
yN−1 − xN−1

JN−1(x˜N−1) = min
yN−1≥xN−1
{cN−1yN−1 + L(yN−1) + γEWN−1{JN(x˜N)}}
+ α∆cN−1min(xN−1, qN−3 + qN−2)+ − cN−1xN−1.
The expected cost-to-go function in the (N − 1)st is the following:
EWN−1{JN(x˜N)} =
∫ ∞
0
JN(x˜N)dF (wN−1)
=
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+
∫ ∞
yN−1−y∗N
GN(y
∗
N)dF (wN−1)
− γα∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+ α∆cN
∫ yN−1
0
min(yN−1 − wN−1, yN−1 − xN−1 + qN−2)dF (wN−1)
− cN
∫ ∞
0
(yN−1wN−1)dF (wN−1) + γcN+1DN .
By using Lemmas 3 and 4 and after a few arrangements:
EWN−1{JN(x˜N)} =
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+GN(y
∗
N)(1− F (yN−1 − y∗N))
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− γα∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+ α∆cN(Φ(yN−1)− Φ(xN−1 − qN−2))− cNyN−1 + cNDN−1
+ γcN+1DN
=
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
−GN(y∗N)F (yN−1 − y∗N)
+ α∆cNΦ(yN−1)− cNyN−1
− γα∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+GN(y
∗
N)− α∆cNΦ(xN−1 − qN−2) + γcN+1DN + cNDN−1.
After a few adjustments we have the following cost-to-go function for the (N−1)st
period:
JN−1(x˜N−1) = min
yN−1≥xN−1
{GN−1(yN−1)}
− γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
− γα∆cNΦ(xN−1 − qN−2) + α∆cN−1min(xN−1, qN−3 + qN−2)+
+ γGN(y
∗
N) + γ
2cN+1DN + γcNDN−1 − cN−1xN−1
where,
GN−1(yN−1) = (cN−1 − γcN)yN−1 + L(yN−1)
+ γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
− γGN(y∗N)F (yN−1 − y∗N) + γα∆cNΦ(yN−1).
Check the second order condition for convexity:
∂GN−1(yN−1)
∂yN−1
= (cN−1 − γcN) + (hN−1 + bN−1)F (yN−1)− bN−1
+ γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
G
′
N(yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1
+ γGN(y
∗
N)f(yN−1 − y∗N)− γGN(y∗N)f(yN−1 − y∗N)
+ γα∆cNF (yN−1)
= (cN−1 − γcN) + (hN−1 + bN−1 + γα∆cN)F (yN−1)− bN−1
+ γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
G
′
N(yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1
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∂2GN−1(yN−1)
∂y2N−1
= (hN−1 + bN−1 + γα∆cN)f(yN−1)
+ γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
G
′′
N(yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1
+ γG
′
N(y
∗
N)f(yN−1 − y∗N)
= (hN−1 + bN−1 + γα∆cN)f(yN−1)
+ γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
G
′′
N(yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1,
where, G
′
N and G
′′
N are the first and the second derivatives of GN(yN) function
wrt yN respectively.
Note that since GN is convex G
′′
N(yN−1 − wN−1) ≥ 0 and G′N(y∗N) = 0 due
to optimality. Additionally, as long as hN−1 + bN−1 + γα∆cN ≥ 0 and hN +
bN + γα∆cN+1 + γcN+1 ≥ 0 GN−1(yN−1) is convex. To prove the convexity of
JN−1(x˜N−1), we check the Hessian of JN−1(x˜N−1).
∂2JN−1(x˜N−1)
∂xN−12
= −γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
f(xN−1−wN−1)dF (wN−1)−γα∆cNf(xN−1−qN−2),
∂2JN−1(x˜N−1)
∂xN−1∂qN−2
= γα∆cNf(xN−1 − qN−2),
∂2JN−1(x˜N−1)
∂xN−1∂qN−3
=
∂2JN−1(x˜N−1)
∂qN−3∂xN−1
=
∂2JN−1(x˜N−1)
∂qN−32
=
∂2JN−1(x˜N−1)
∂qN−3∂qN−2
=
∂2JN−1(x˜N−1)
∂qN−2∂qN−3
= 0,
∂2JN−1(x˜N−1)
∂qN−2∂xN−1
= γα∆cNf(xN−1 − qN−2),
∂2JN−1(x˜N−1)
∂qN−22
= −γα∆cNf(xN−1 − qN−2).
Assume u1 ≥ 0, u2 ≥ 0, u3 ≥ 0 and z = (u1 u2 u3)t. Let K =
γ2α∆cN+1
∫∞
0
f(xN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1) and A = γα∆cNf(xN−1 − qN−2). Note
that K ≤ 0 and A ≤ 0 since ∆cN+1 ≤ 0 and ∆cN ≤ 0 and f(.) ≥ 0.
ztHN−1z =
[
u1 u2 u3
]
−K − A 0 A
0 0 0
A 0 −A


u1
u2
u3

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=
[
u1(−K − A) + u3A 0 (u1 − u3)A
]
u1
u2
u3

= (u1(−K − A) + u3A)u1 + (u1A− u3A)u3
= −Ku21 − A(u1 − u3)2 ≥ 0
Therefore Hessian Matrix of JN−1 is positive definite. Thus JN−1(x˜N−1) is convex
in xN−1, qN−3 and qN−2.
If we extend the argument for the (N − 2)nd period, we have the following state
vectors for the (N − 2)nd and (N − 1)st periods:
x˜tN−2 =

xN−2
qN−4
qN−3

x˜tN−1 =

xN−2 + qN−2 − wN−2
qN−3
qN−2
 =

yN−2 − wN−2
qN−3
yN−2 − xN−2
 .
Cost-to-go function for the (N − 2)nd is the following:
JN−2(x˜N−2) = min
yN−2≥xN−2
{cN−2yN−2 + L(yN−2) + γEWN−2{JN−1(x˜N−1)}}
+ α∆cN−2min(xN−2, qN−4 + qN−3)+ − cN−2xN−2.
Assuming y∗N−1 ≥ 0 expected cost-to-go function in the (N − 2)nd period can be
written as follows by using Lemmas 3 and 4:
EWN−2(JN−1) =
∫ ∞
0
JN−1(x˜N−1)dF (wN−2)
=
∫ yN−2−y∗N−1
0
GN−1(yN−2 − wN−2)dF (wN−2)
+ GN−1(y∗N−1)−GN−1(y∗N−1)F (yN−2 − y∗N−1)
− γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−2 − wN−1 − wN−2)dF (wN−1)dF (wN−2)
− γα∆cN
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xN−2 − wN−2)dF (wN−2)
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THEOREMS 72
+ α∆cN−1
∫ yN−2
0
min(yN−2 −WN−2, qN−3 + yN−2 − xN−2)
+ γGN(y
∗
N) + cN−1DN−2 − cN−1yN−2 + γ2cN+1DN + γcNDN−1
=
∫ yN−2−y∗N−1
0
GN−1(yN−2 − wN−2)dF (wN−2)
+ GN−1(y∗N−1)−GN−1(y∗N−1)F (yN−2 − y∗N−1)
− γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−2 − wN−1 − wN−2)dF (wN−1)dF (wN−2)
− γα∆cN
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xN−2 − wN−2)dF (wN−2)
− α∆cN−1Φ(xN−2 − qN−3) + α∆cN−1Φ(yN−2)
+ GN−1(y∗N−1) + γGN(y
∗
N)
+ cN−1DN−2 + γcNDN−1 + γ2cN+1DN − cN−1yN−2.
After all these calculations and arranging the terms, cost-to-go function for the
(N − 2)nd period in terms of GN−2 becomes
JN−2(x˜N−2) = min
yN−2≥xN−2
{GN−2(yN−2)}+ α∆cN−2min(xN−2, qN−4 + qN−3)+
− γα∆cN−1Φ(xN−2 − qN−3)
− γ2α∆cN
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xN−2 − wN−2)dF (wN−2)
+ γGN−1(y∗N−1) + γ
2GN(y
∗
N)
+ γcN−1DN−2 + γ2cNDN−1 + γ3cN+1DN − cN−2xN−2
where
GN−2(yN−2) = (cN−2 − γcN−1)yN−2 + L(yN−2)
+ γ
∫ yN−2−y∗N−1
0
GN−1(yN−2 − wN−2)dF (wN−2)
− γGN−1(y∗N−1)F (yN−2 − y∗N−1)
− γ3α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−2 − wN−1 − wN−2)dF (wN−1)dF (wN−2)
+ γα∆cN−1Φ(yN−2).
The convexity of GN−2(yN−2) in yN−2 and JN−2(x˜N−2) in xN−2, qN−3, qN−2 can
be shown easily by using the same reasoning with the (N − 1)st period. Now
assume that (i) and (ii) hold for periods k + 1, k + 2, ..., N , the following state
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vectors for the kth and (k+1)st periods and cost-to-go function of the kth period
can be written as:
x˜tk =

xk
qk−2
qk−1

x˜tk+1 =

xk + qk − wk
qk−1
qk
 =

yk − wk
qk−1
yk − xk
 ,
Jk(x˜k) = min
yk≥xk
{ckyk + L(yk) + γEWk{Jk+1(x˜k+1)}}+ α∆ckmin(xk, qk−1 + qk−2)
− ckxk.
Cost-to-go function in the (k + 1)st period can be written as follows by the in-
ductive hypothesis,
Jk+1(x˜k+1) = min
yk+1≥xk+1
{Gk+1(yk+1)}
− γ2α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xk+1 − wk+1)dF (wk+1)− ck+1xk+1
− γα∆ck+2Φ(xk+1 − qk) + α∆ck+1min(xk+1, qk−1 + qk)+
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k+1
γi−k
(
ci+1Di +Gi+1(y
∗
i+1)
))
+ γN−kcN+1DN .
By using Lemmas 3 and 4 and adjusting the terms, we have,
EWk{Jk+1(x˜k+1)} =
∫ ∞
0
Jk+1(x˜k+1)dF (wk)
=
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk) +Gk+1(y∗k+1)
−Gk+1(y∗k+1)F (yk − y∗k+1)
− γ2α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk+1 − wk)dF (wk+1)dF (wk)
− γα∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xk − wk)dF (wk)
+ α∆ck+1
∫ yk
0
min(yk −Wk, qk−1 + yk − xk)
− ck+1yk + ck+1Dk
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k+1
γi−k
(
ci+1Di +Gi+1(y
∗
i+1)
))
+ γN−kcN+1DN
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=
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)
−Gk+1(y∗k+1)F (yk − y∗k+1)
− γ2α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk+1 − wk)dF (wk+1)dF (wk)
− γα∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xk − wk)dF (wk)
− α∆ck+1Φ(xk − qk−1) + α∆ck+1Φ(yk)
− ck+1yk + ck+1Dk
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k+1
γi−k
(
ci+1Di +Gi+1(y
∗
i+1)
))
+ γN−kcN+1DN
Therefore, cost-to-go function in the kth period is:
Jk(x˜k) = min
yk≥xk
{Gk(yk)} − γ2α∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xk − wk)dF (wk)
− γα∆ck+1Φ(xk − qk−1) + α∆ckmin(xk, qk−2 + qk−1)+
+
(
i=N∑
i=k
γi+1−k
(
ci+1Di +Gi+1(y
∗
i+1)
))
+ γN+1−kcN+1DN − ckxk
where,
Gk(yk) = min
yk≥xk
{(ck − γck+1)yk + L(yk)
+ γ
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)− γGk+1(y∗k+1)F (yk − y∗k+1)
− γ3α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk+1 − wk)dF (wk+1)dF (wk)
+ γα∆ck+1Φ(yk)}.
For convexity, check the second order condition.
∂Gk(yk)
∂yk
= (ck − γck+1) + (hk + bk)F (yk)− bk − γGk+1(y∗k+1)f(yk − y∗k+1)
+ γ
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
G
′
k+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)
+ γGk+1(y
∗
k+1)f(yk − y∗k+1)
− γ3α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
F (yk − wk+1 − wk)dF (wk+1)dF (wk)
+ γα∆ck+1F (yk)
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= (ck − γck+1 − bk) + (hk + bk + γα∆ck+1)F (yk)
+ γ
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
G
′
k+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)
− γ3α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
F (yk − wk+1 − wk)dF (wk+1)dF (wk),
∂2GN−2(yN−2)
∂y2N−2
= (hk + bk + γα∆ck+1)f(yk)
+ γ
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
G
′′
k+1(yk − wk)f(wk)dwk
+G
′
k+1(y
∗
k+1)f(yk − y∗k+1)
− γ3α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
f(yk − wk+1 − wk)dF (wk+1)dF (wk).
Note that since Gk+1 is convex G
′′
k+1(yk − wk) ≥ 0 and also G′k+1(y∗k+1) = 0 due
to optimality. Additionally, as long as hi + bi + γα∆ci+1 ≥ 0 ∀ i = k, ..., N − 1
and hN + bN + γα∆cN+1 + γcN+1 ≥ 0, Gk(yk) is convex in yk.
The Hessian of Jk(x˜k) is:
∂2Jk(x˜k)
∂xk2
= −γ2α∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
f(xk − wk)dF (wk)− γα∆ck+1f(xk − qk−1)
∂2Jk(x˜k)
∂xk∂qk−1
= γα∆ck+1f(xk − qk−1)
∂2Jk(x˜k)
∂qk−2∂xk
=
∂2Jk(x˜k)
∂xk∂qk−2
=
∂2Jk(x˜k)
∂qk−22
=
∂2Jk(x˜k)
∂qk−2∂qk−1
=
∂2Jk(x˜k)
∂qk−1∂qk−2
= 0
∂2Jk(x˜k)
∂qk−1∂xk
= γα∆ck+1f(xk − qk−1)
∂2Jk(x˜k)
∂qk−12
= −γα∆ck+1f(xk − qk−1)
Assume u1 ≥ 0, u2 ≥ 0, u3 ≥ 0 and z = (u1 u2 u3)and let K =
γ2α∆ck+2
∫∞
0
f(xk − wk)dF (wk) and A = γα∆ck+1f(xk − qk−1).
ztHkz =
[
u1 u2 u3
]
−K − A 0 A
0 0 0
A 0 −A


u1
u2
u3

=
[
u1(−K − A) + u3A 0 (u1 − u3)A
]
u1
u2
u3

= (u1(−K − A) + u3A)u1 + (u1A− u3A)u3 = −Ku21 − A(u1 − u3)2 ≥ 0
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Thus Jk(x˜k) is convex in xk, qk−2 and qk−1. Therefore, order-up-to policy is
optimal for the retailer.
¤
Proof of Theorem 3: We need additional Lemmas in order to prove Theorem
3.
Lemma 5 Ew{min(y,W )} = y − Φ(y).
Proof:
Ew{min(y, w)} =
∫ y
0
wdF (w) +
∫ ∞
y
ydF (w)
= wF (w) |y0 −
∫ y
0
F (w)dw +
∫ ∞
y
ydF (w)
= yF (y)− Φ(y) + y(1− F (y)) = y − Φ(y).
Lemma 6
∫∞
0
max(w − y, 0)dF (w) = D − Φ(y)
Proof:∫ ∞
0
max(w − y, 0)dF (w) =
∫ ∞
y
(w − y, 0)dF (w)
=
∫ ∞
y
wdF (w)− yF (y) = D −
∫ y
0
wdF (w)− yF (y)
By using Lemma 1, the following can be written,∫ ∞
0
max(w − y, 0)dF (w) = D − yF (y) + Φ(y)− yF (y) = D + Φ(y).
¤
The state and the evolution equation of the problem is the same as the SBM,
therefore they are not written again and again for each period. We similarly
prove by induction. The profit-to-go function in the N th period is:
RN(x˜N) = max
qN≥0
{−cNqN + pN max(−xN , 0) + pNEWN{min(xN + qN ,WN)+}
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− L(xN + qN)− α∆cN min(xN , qN−1)+
− γα∆cN+1EWN{min(qN , xN + qN −WN)+}
+ γ(pN+1 − cN+1)EWN{max(WN − xN − qN , 0)}}.
In terms of yN ,
RN(x˜N) = max
yN≥xN
{−cNyN + pN max(−xN , 0) + pNEWN{min(yN ,WN)}
− L(yN)− α∆cN min(xN , qN−1)+
− γα∆cN+1EWN{min(yN − xN , yN −WN)+}
+ γ(pN+1 − cN+1)EWN{max(WN − yN , 0)}}+ cNxN .
By using Lemmas 5 and Lemma 3,
GN(yN |xN) = −cNyN + pN(yN − Φ(yN))− L(yN)− γα∆cN+1(Φ(yN)− Φ(xN))
+ γ(pN+1 − cN+1)(DN − yN + Φ(yN)).
After a few adjustments,
GN(yN |xN) = yN(−cN + pN + γcN+1 − γpN+1)
+ Φ(yN)(−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γpN+1 − γcN+1)
− L(yN) + γα∆cN+1Φ(xN) + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)DN .
The profit-to-go function at the N th period can be written as,
RN(x˜N) = max
yN≥xN
{GN(yN)}+ γα∆cN+1Φ(xN)
− α∆cN min(xN , qN−1)+ + pN max(−xN , 0) + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)DN
+ cNxN
where,
GN(yN) = yN(−cN + pN + γcN+1 − γpN+1)
+ Φ(yN)(−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γpN+1 − γcN+1)− L(yN).
For concavity, check the second order condition.
∂GN(yN)
∂yN
= (−cN + pN + γcN+1 − γpN+1)
+ F (yN)(−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γpN+1 − γcN+1)
− F (yN)(hN + bN)− bN ,
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∂GN(yN)
2
∂2yN
= f(yN)(−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γpN+1 − γcN+1)− f(yN)(hN + bN)
= (−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γpN+1 − γcN+1 − hN − bN)f(yN).
If (−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γpN+1 − γcN+1 − hN − bN) ≤ 0, GN(yN) is concave in yN .
Optimal order-up-to level for the N th period can be found by,
∂GN(yN)
∂yN
= (−cN + pN + γcN+1 − γpN+1)
+ F (yN)(−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γpN+1 − γcN+1 − hN − bN)− bN = 0
F (y∗N) =
bN + cN − pN − γcN+1 + γpN+1
−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γpN+1 − γcN+1 − hN − bN
y∗N = F
−1
(
bN + cN − pN − γcN+1 + γpN+1
−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γpN+1 − γcN+1 − hN − bN
)
.
The Hessian of RN(x˜N) is:
HN = HN(RN(x˜N)) =
[
∂2RN (x˜N )
∂xN 2
∂2RN (x˜N )
∂xN∂qN−1
∂2RN (x˜N )
∂qN−1∂xN
∂2RN (x˜N )
∂qN−12
]
∂2RN(x˜N)
∂xN 2
=
∂
∂xN
(α∆cN+1F (xN)) = γα∆cN+1f(xN) ≤ 0
∂2RN(x˜N)
∂xN∂qN−1
=
∂2RN(x˜N)
∂qN−1∂xN
=
∂2RN(x˜N)
∂q2N−1
= 0
ztHNz > 0 for all z ∈ <2 > 0 z = (u1 u2)t .
ztHNz =
[
u1 u2
] [ γα∆cN+1f(xN) 0
0 0
][
u1
u2
]
= γα∆cN+1f(xN)u
2
1 ≤ 0,
since ∆cN+1 ≤ 0. Thus RN(x˜N) is concave in qN−1 and xN .
For the (N − 1)st period the following profit-to-go function can be written:
RN−1(x˜N−1) = max
yN−1≥xN−1
{−cN−1qN−1 + pN−1max(−xN−1, 0)
+ pN−1EWN−1{min(xN−1 + qN−1,WN−1)+}
−L(xN−1 + qN−1)− α∆cN−1min(xN−1, qN−2)+
+γEWN−1(RN(x˜N))
}
.
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By using Lemma 5,
RN−1(x˜N−1) = max
yN−1≥xN−1
{−cN−1yN−1 + pN−1(yN−1 − Φ(yN−1))− L(yN−1)
+γEWN−1(RN−1(x˜N))
}
+ pN−1max(−xN−1, 0)− α∆cN−1min(xN−1, qN−2)+
+ cN−1xN−1.
Expected profit-to-go function in the (N − 1)st period is,
EWN−1(RN(x˜N)) =
∫ ∞
0
RN(x˜N)dF (wN−1)
=
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+GN(y
∗
N)(1− F (yN−1 − y∗N))
+ γα∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
− α∆cN
∫ yN−1
0
min(yN−1 − wN−1, yN−1 − xN−1)dF (wN−1)
+ pN
∫ ∞
0
max(wN−1 − yN , 0)dF (wN−1)
+ cN
∫ ∞
0
(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1) + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)DN
=
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+GN(y
∗
N)(1− F (yN−1 − y∗N))
+ γα∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
− α∆cN(Φ(yN−1)− Φ(xN−1)) + pN(DN−1 + Φ(yN−1))
+ cN(yN−1 −DN−1) + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)DN
=
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
−GN(y∗N)F (yN−1 − y∗N)
+ γα∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
− (α∆cN − pN)Φ(yN−1) + cNyN−1
+ α∆cNΦ(xN−1) + (pN − cN)DN−1 +GN(y∗N)
+ γ(pN+1 − cN+1)DN .
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Then the profit-to-go function at the (N − 1)st period can be written as,
RN−1(x˜N−1) = max
yN−1≥xN−1
{GN−1(yN−1)}+ γα∆cNΦ(xN−1)
− α∆cN−1min(xN−1, qN−2)+ + pN−1max(−xN−1, 0)− cN−1xN−1
+ γGN(y
∗
N) + γ
2(pN+1 − cN+1)DN + γ(pN − cN)DN−1.
where
GN−1(yN−1) = (−cN−1 + γcN + pN−1)yN−1 + Φ(yN−1)(−pN−1 + γpN − γα∆cN)
− L(yN−1) + γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
− γGN(y∗N)F (yN−1 − y∗N)
+ γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1).
For concavity, check the second order condition.
∂GN−1(yN−1)
∂yN−1
= (−cN−1 + γcN + pN−1) + (−pN−1 + γpN − γα∆cN)F (yN−1)
− (hN−1 + bN−1)F (yN−1) + bN−1
+ γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
G
′
N(yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1
+ γGN(y
∗
N)f(yN−1 − y∗N)− γGN(y∗N)f(yN−1 − y∗N)
+ γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
F (yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
= −cN−1 + γcN + pN−1 + (−pN−1 + γpN − γα∆cN)F (yN−1)
− (hN−1 + bN−1)F (yN−1) + bN−1
+ γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
G
′
N(yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1
+ γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
F (yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1),
∂2GN−1(yN−1)
∂y2N−1
= (−pN−1 + γpN − γα∆cN − hN−1 − bN−1)f(yN−1)
+ γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
G′′N(yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1
+ γG′N(y∗N)f(yN−1 − y∗N)
+ γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
f(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1).
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Since GN is concave G
′′
N(yN−1 − wN−1) ≤ 0 and G′N(y∗N) = 0 due to optimality,
therefore if (−pN−1+ γpN − γα∆cN − hN−1− bN−1) ≤ 0, GN−1(yN−1) is concave.
Also the Hessian of RN−1(x˜N−1) is:
∂2RN−1(x˜N−1)
∂xN−12
=
∂
∂xN−1
(γα∆cNF (xN−1)) = γα∆cNf(xN−1) ≤ 0,
∂2RN−1(x˜N−1)
∂xN−1∂qN−2
=
∂2RN−1(x˜N−1)
∂qN−2∂xN−1
=
∂2RN−1(x˜N−1)
∂qN−22
= 0,
ztH((RN−1(x˜N−1))z > 0 for all z ∈ <2 > 0 z = (u1 u2)t.
ztH((RN−1(x˜N−1))z =
[
u1 u2
] [ γα∆cNf(xN−1) 0
0 0
][
u1
u2
]
= γα∆cNf(xN−1)u21 ≤ 0,
since ∆cN < 0. Thus RN−1(x˜N−1) is concave in qN−2 and xN−1.
Assume that (i) and (ii) holds for periods k + 1, k + 2, ..., N , the following
profit-to-go function in the kth period can be written,
Rk(x˜k) = max
yk≥xk
{−ckqk + pkmax(−xk, 0) + pkEWk{min(xk + qk,Wk)+}
−L(xk + qk)− α∆ckmin(xk, qk−1)+ + γEWk(Rk+1(x˜k+1))
}
.
Profit-to-go function in the (k+1)st period is the following by inductive hypoth-
esis:
Rk+1(x˜k+1) = max
yk+1≥xk+1
{Gk+1(yk+1)}+ γ2α∆ck+2Φ(xk+1)
− α∆ck+1min(xk+1, qk)+ + pk+1max(−xk+1, 0)− ck+1xk+1
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k+1
γi−k
(
(pi+1 − ci+1)Di +Gi+1(y∗i+1)
))
+ γN−kcN+1DN .
By using Lemmas 3 and 4, the expected profit-to-go function in the kth can be
written,
EWk(Rk+1(x˜k+1)) =
∫ ∞
0
Rk+1(x˜k+1)dF (wk)
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=
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)
+Gk+1(y
∗
k+1)(1− F (yk − y∗k+1))
+ γα∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk)dF (wk)
− α∆ck+1
∫ yk
0
min(yk − wk, yk − xk)dF (wk)
+ pk+1
∫ ∞
0
max(wk − yk, 0)dF (wk)
+ ck+1
∫ ∞
0
(yk − wk)dF (wk)
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k+1
γi−k
(
(pi+1 − ci+1)Di +Gi+1(y∗i+1)
))
+ γN−kcN+1DN
=
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)
+Gk+1(y
∗
k+1)(1− F (yk − y∗k+1))
+ γα∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk)dF (wk)
− α∆ck+1(Φ(yk)− Φ(xk)) + pk+1Dk + pk+1Φ(yN−1)
+ ck+1yk − ck+1Dk
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k+1
γi−k
(
(pi+1 − ci+1)Di +Gi+1(y∗i+1)
))
+ γN−kcN+1DN
=
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)−Gk+1(y∗k+1)F (yk − y∗k+1)
+ γα∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk)dF (wk)
− (α∆ck+1 − pk+1)Φ(yN−1)
+ ck+1yk + α∆ck+1Φ(xk) + (pk+1 − ck+1)Dk
+Gk+1(y
∗
k+1) +
(
i=N−1∑
i=k+1
γi−k
(
(pi+1 − ci+1)Di +Gi+1(y∗i+1)
))
+ γN−kcN+1DN .
By using Lemma 5,
Rk(x˜k) = max
yk≥xk
{−ckyk + pk(yk − Φ(yk))− L(yk) + γEWk(Rk(x˜k+1))}
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+ pkmax(−xk, 0)− α∆ckmin(xk, qk−1)+ + ckxk.
After a few arrangements,
Rk(x˜k) = max
yk≥xk
{Gk(yk)}+ γα∆ck+1Φ(xk) + pkmax(−xk, 0)
− α∆ckmin(xk, qk−1)+
− ckxk +
(
i=N−1∑
i=k
γi+1−k
(
(pi+1 − ci+1)Di +Gi+1(y∗i+1)
))
+ γN+1−kcN+1DN
∀ k = 1, 2, ..., N − 1
where
Gk(yk) = (−ck + γck+1 + pk)yk + (−pk + γpk+1 − γα∆ck+1)Φ(yk)
− L(yk) + γ
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)
− γGk+1(y∗k+1)F (yk − y∗k+1) + γ2α∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk)dF (wk).
For concavity, check the second order condition.
∂2Gk(yk)
∂y2k
= (−pk + γpk+1 − γα∆ck+1)f(yk)− (hk + bk)f(yk)
+ γ
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
G′′k+1(yk − wk)f(wk)dwk
+ γG′k+1(y∗k+1)f(yk − y∗k+1) + γ2α∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
f(yk − wk)dF (wk)
Since Gk+1 is assumed to be concave G
′′
k+1(yk − wk) ≤ 0 and G′k+1(y∗k+1) = 0
due to optimality, therefore if (−pk + γpk+1 − γα∆ck+1 − hk − bk) ≤ 0, Gk(yk) is
concave.
The Hessian of Rk(x˜k) when z ∈ <2 > 0 z = (u1 u2)t,
ztHkz =
[
u1 u2
] [ γα∆ck+1f(xk) 0
0 0
][
u1
u2
]
= γα∆ck+1f(xk)u
2
1 ≤ 0.
Thus Rk(x˜k) is concave in qk−1 and xk and order-up-to policy is optimal for
the retailer in MBM when the protection age limit is announced as one by the
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supplier, therefore (iii) is shown.
¤
Proof of Theorem 4 We prove by induction.
Profit-to-go function at the N th period is:
RN(x˜N) = max
qN≥0
{−cNqN + pN max(−xN , 0) + pNEWN{min(xN + qN ,WN)+}
− L(xN + qN)− α∆cN min(xN , qN−1 + qN−2)+
− γα∆cN+1EWN{min(qN + qN−1, xN + qN −WN)+}
+ γ(pN+1 − cN+1)EWN{max(WN − xN − qN , 0)}}.
By using Lemmas 3, 5 and 6 profit-to-go function can be written in terms of yN
as,
RN(x˜N) = max
yN≥xN
{−cNyN + pN max(−xN , 0) + pNEWN{min(yN ,WN)}
− L(yN)− α∆cN min(xN , qN−1 + qN−2)+
− γα∆cN+1EWN{min(yN − (xN − qN−1), yN −WN)+}
+ γ(pN+1 − cN+1)EWN{max(WN − yN , 0)}}+ cNxN
= max
yN≥xN
{−cNyN + pN max(−xN , 0) + pN(yN − Φ(yN))
− L(yN)− α∆cN min(xN , qN−1 + qN−2)+
− γα∆cN+1(Φ(yN)− Φ(xN − qN−1))
+ γ(pN+1 − cN+1)(DN − yN + Φ(yN))}+ cNxN .
Profit-to-go function at the N th period is:
RN(x˜N) = max
yN≥xN
{GN(yN)}+ γα∆cN+1Φ(xN − qN−1)
− α∆cN min(xN , qN−1 + qN−2)+
+ pN max(−xN , 0) + cNxN + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)DN
where
GN(yN) = yN(−cN + pN − γ(pN+1 − cN+1))
+ Φ(yN)(−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γ(pN+1 − cN+1))− L(yN).
For concavity, check the second order condition,
∂GN(yN)
∂yN
= (−cN + pN − γ(pN+1 − cN+1) +
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(−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γ(pN+1 − cN+1))F (yN)
− F (yN)(hN + bN)− bN
∂2GN(yN)
∂2yN
= f(yN)(−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)− hN − bN).
If −pN − γα∆cN+1 + γ(pN+1 − cN+1) − hN − bN ≤ 0, GN(yN) is concave in yN .
The optimal order-up-to level in the last period can be found by,
∂GN(yN)
∂yN
= (−cN + pN − γ(pN+1 − cN+1))
+ F (y∗N)(−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)− hN − bN)− bN = 0,
F (y∗N) =
bN + cN − pN + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)
−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)− hN − bN ,
y∗N = F
−1
(
bN + cN − pN + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)
−pN − γα∆cN+1 + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)− hN − bN
)
.
The Hessian of RN(x˜N),
H(RN(x˜N)) =

∂2RN (x˜N )
∂xN 2
∂2RN (x˜N )
∂xN∂qN−1
∂2RN (x˜N )
∂xN∂qN−2
∂2RN (x˜N )
∂qN−1∂xN
∂2RN (x˜N )
∂qN−12
∂2RN (x˜N )
∂qN−1∂qN−2
∂2RN (x˜N )
∂qN−2∂xN
∂2RN (x˜N )
∂qN−2∂qN−1
∂2RN (x˜N )
∂qN−22
 .
∂2RN(x˜N))
∂xN 2
= γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1),
∂2RN(x˜N))
∂xN∂qN−1
= −γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1),
∂2RN(x˜N))
∂qN−1∂xN
= −γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1),
∂2RN(x˜N)
∂qN−12
= γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1),
∂2RN(x˜N))
∂xN∂qN−2
=
∂2RN(x˜N))
∂qN−1∂qN−2
=
∂2RN(x˜N))
∂qN−2∂xN
=
∂2RN(x˜N))
∂qN−2∂qN−1
=
∂2RN(x˜N))
∂qN−22
= 0,
HN = H(RN(x˜N))) =

γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1) −γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1) 0
−γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1) γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1) 0
0 0 0

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z = (u1 u2 u3)
t,
ztHNz = γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1)(u1(u1 − u2)− u2(u1 − u2))
= γα∆cN+1f(xN − qN−1)(u1 − u2)2 ≤ 0,
since ∆cN+1 < 0. Thus RN(x˜N) is concave in xN , qN−2 and qN−1.
For the (N−1)st period the following profit-to-go function will be written provided
that the system state is x˜N−1,
RN−1(x˜N−1) = max
yN−1≥xN−1
{−cN−1qN−1 + pN−1max(−xN−1, 0)
+ pN−1EWN−1{min(xN−1 + qN−1,WN−1)+}
− L(xN−1 + qN−1)− α∆cN−1min(xN−1, qN−2 + qN−3)+
+γEWN−1(RN(x˜N))
}
By using Lemmas 3, 5 and 6 and after a few arrangements,
RN−1(x˜N−1) = max
yN−1≥xN−1
{−cN−1yN−1 + pN−1(yN−1 − Φ(yN−1))
−L(yN−1) + γEWN−1(RN(x˜N))
}
+ pN−1max(−xN−1, 0)− α∆cN−1min(xN−1, qN−2 + qN−3)+
+ cN−1xN−1.
Expected profit-to-go at the (N − 1)st period is the following:
EWN−1(RN(x˜N)) =
∫ ∞
0
RN(x˜N)dF (wN−1)
=
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+GN(y
∗
N)(1− F (yN−1 − y∗N))
+ γα∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−1 − wN−1 − yN−1 + xN−1)dF (wN−1)
+ γ(pN+1 − cN+1)DN
− α∆cN
∫ yN−1
0
min(yN−1 − wN−1, yN−1 − xN−1 + qN−2)dF (wN−1)
+ pN
∫ ∞
0
max(wN−1 − yN , 0)dF (wN−1)
+ cN
∫ ∞
0
(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
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=
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1) +GN(y∗N)
−GN(y∗N)F (yN−1 − y∗N)
+ γα∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
− α∆cN(Φ(yN−1)− Φ(xN−1 − qN−2)) + pN(DN−1 + Φ(yN−1))
+ cN(yN−1 −DN−1) + γ(pN+1 − cN+1)DN
=
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
−GN(y∗N)F (yN−1 − y∗N)
+ (−α∆cN + pN)Φ(yN−1) + cNyN−1
+ γα∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+ α∆cNΦ(xN−1 − qN−2) + (pN − cN)DN−1
+ γ(pN+1 − cN+1)DN +GN(y∗N)
Then the profit-to-go function at the (N − 1)st period is,
RN−1(x˜N−1) = max
yN−1≥xN−1
{GN−1(yN−1)}
+ γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
+ γα∆cNΦ(xN−1 − qN−2) + γ(pN − cN)DN−1
+ γ2(pN+1 − cN+1)DN + γGN(y∗N)
+ pN−1max(−xN−1, 0)− α∆cN−1min(xN−1, qN−2 + qN−3)+
+ cN−1xN−1
where,
GN−1(yN−1) = (−cN−1 + γcN + pN−1)yN−1
+ (−γα∆cN + γpN − pN−1)Φ(yN−1)
− L(yN−1) + γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
GN(yN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)
− γGN(y∗N)F (yN−1 − y∗N).
For concavity, check the second order condition.
∂GN−1(yN−1)
∂yN−1
= (−cN−1 + γcN + pN−1) + (−γα∆cN + γpN − pN−1)F (yN−1)
APPENDIX A. PROOF OF THEOREMS 88
− (hN−1 + bN−1)F (yN−1) + bN−1
+ γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
G
′
N(yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1
+ γGN(y
∗
N)f(yN−1 − y∗N)− γGN(y∗N)f(yN−1 − y∗N)
= (−cN−1 + γcN + pN−1)
+ (−γα∆cN + γpN − pN−1 − hN−1 − bN−1)F (yN−1)
+ bN−1 + γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
G
′
N(yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1,
∂2GN−1(yN−1)
∂y2N−1
= (−γα∆cN + γpN − pN−1 − h− b)f(yN−1)
+ γ
∫ yN−1−y∗N
0
G
′′
N(yN−1 − wN−1)f(wN−1)dwN−1
+ γG
′
N(y
∗
N)f(yN−1 − y∗N).
Since GN is concave, G
′′
N(yN−1 − wN−1) ≤ 0 and G′N(y∗N) = 0 due to optimality,
therefore if (−γα∆cN + γpN − pN−1− hN−1− bN−1) ≤ 0, GN−1(yN−1) is concave.
The Hessian of RN−1(x˜N−1):
∂2RN−1(x˜N−1)
∂xN−12
= γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
f(xN−1−wN−1)dF (wN−1)+γα∆cNf(xN−1−qN−2),
∂2RN−1(x˜N−1)
∂xN−1∂qN−2
= −γα∆cNf(xN−1 − qN−2),
∂2RN−1(x˜N−1)
∂xN−1∂qN−3
=
∂2RN−1(x˜N−1)
∂qN−3∂xN−1
=
∂2RN−1(x˜N−1)
∂qN−32
=
∂2RN−1(x˜N−1)
∂qN−3∂qN−2
=
∂2RN−1(x˜N−1)
∂qN−2∂qN−3
= 0,
∂2RN−1(x˜N−1)
∂qN−2∂xN−1
= −γα∆cNf(xN−1 − qN−2),
∂2RN−1(x˜N−1)
∂qN−22
= γα∆cNf(xN−1 − qN−2),
z = (u1 u2 u3)
t and let K = γ2α∆cN+1
∫∞
0
f(xN−1 − wN−1)dF (wN−1) ≤ 0 and
A = γα∆cNf(xN−1 − qN−2) ≤ 0.
ztHN−1z =
[
u1 u2 u3
]
K + A 0 −A
0 0 0
−A 0 A


u1
u2
u3

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=
[
u1(K + A)− u3A 0 (−u1 + u3)A
]
u1
u2
u3

= (u1(K + A)− u3A)u1 + (−u1A+ u3A)u3
= Ku21 + A(u1 − u3)2 ≤ 0
Thus RN−1(x˜N−1) is concave in xN−1, qN−3 and qN−2.
For the (N − 2)nd period, the profit-to-go function is,
RN−2(x˜N−2) = max
yN−2≥xN−2
{−cN−2yN−2 + pN−2(yN−2 − Φ(yN−2))
−L(yN−2) + EWN−2(RN−1(x˜N−1))
}
+ pN−2max(−xN−2, 0)− α∆cN−2min(xN−2, qN−4 + qN−3)+
+ cN−2xN−2.
Expected profit-to-go function in the (N − 2)nd period is,
EWN−2(RN−1) =
∫ ∞
0
RN−1(x˜N−1)dF (wN−2)
=
∫ yN−2−y∗N−1
0
GN−1(yN−2 − wN−2)dF (wN−2)
+GN−1(y∗N−1)(1− F (yN−2 − y∗N−1))
+ γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−2 − wN−2 − wN−1)dF (wN−2)dF (wN−1)
+ γα∆cN
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−2 − wN−2 − (yN−2 − xN−2))dF (wN−2)
+ γ(pN − cN)DN−1 + γ2(pN+1 − cN+1)DN + γGN(y∗N)
+ pN−1(DN−2 + Φ(yN−2))
− α∆cN−1(Φ(yN−2)− Φ(xN−2 − qN−3)) + cN−1yN−1 − cN−1DN−2
=
∫ yN−2−y∗N−1
0
GN−1(yN−2 − wN−2)dF (wN−2)
−GN−1(y∗N−1)F (yN−2 − y∗N−1)
+ γ2α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−2 − wN−2 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)dF (wN−2)
+ (pN−1 − α∆cN−1)Φ(yN−2) + cN−1yN−2
+ γα∆cN
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xN−2 − wN−2)dF (wN−2)
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+ α∆cN−1Φ(xN−2 − qN−3)
+ (pN−1 − cN−1)DN−2 + γ(pN − cN)DN−1
+ γ2(pN+1 − cN+1)DN
+GN−1(y∗N−1) + γGN(y
∗
N).
After a few arrangements,
RN−2(x˜N−2) = max
yN−2≥xN−2
{GN−2(yN−2)}
+ γ2α∆cN
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xN−2 − wN−2)dF (wN−2)
+ γα∆cN−1Φ(xN−2 − qN−3)− α∆cN−2min(xN−2, qN−4 + qN−3)+
+ pN−2max(−xN−2, 0) + cN−2xN−2
+ γ(pN−1 − cN−1)DN−2 + γ2(pN − cN)DN−1
+ γ3(pN+1 − cN+1)DN
+ γGN−1(y∗N−1) + γ
2GN(y
∗
N)
where,
GN−2(yN−2) = (−cN−2 + γcN−1 + pN−2)yN−2
+ (−γα∆cN−1 + γpN−1 − pN−2)Φ(yN−2)
− L(yN−2) + γ
∫ yN−2−y∗N−1
0
GN−1(yN−2 − wN−2)dF (wN−2)
− γGN−1(y∗N−1)F (yN−2 − y∗N−1)
+ γ3α∆cN+1
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yN−2 − wN−2 − wN−1)dF (wN−1)dF (wN−2).
The concavity of the GN−2(yN−2) and RN−2(x˜N−2) in yN−2 and in
xN−2, qN−3, qN−4 respectively can be shown similar to the (N − 1)st case. As-
sume (i) and (ii) hold for periods k + 1, k + 2, ..., N., then profit-to-go function
for the kth period can be written as,
Rk(x˜k) = max
yk≥xk
{−ckqk + pkmax(−xk, 0) + pkEWk{min(xk + qk,Wk)+}
−L(xk + qk)− α∆ckmin(xk, qk−2 + qk−1)+ + γEWk(Rk+1(x˜k+1))
}
.
And by inductive hypothesis the profit-to-go function for the (k + 1)st period is,
Rk+1(x˜k+1) = max
yk+1≥xk+1
{Gk+1(yk+1)}
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+ γ2α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xk+1 − wk+1)dF (wk+1)
+ γα∆ck+2Φ(xk+1 − qk)
+ pk+1max(−xk+1, 0)− α∆ck+1min(xk+1, qk−1 + qk)+
+ ck+1xk+1 +
(
i=N−1∑
i=k+1
γi−k
(
(pi+1 − ci+1)Di +Gi+1(y∗i+1)
))
+ γN−kcN+1DN .
By the use of Lemmas 3, 5 and 6 and after a few arrangements,
Rk(x˜k) = max
yk≥xk
{−ckyk + pk(yk − Φ(yk))− L(yk) + γEWk(Rk+1(x˜k+1))}
+ pkmax(−xk, 0)− α∆ckmin(xk, qk−2 + qk−1)+ + ckxk.
Expected profit-to-go function in the kth period is,
EWk(Rk+1) =
∫ ∞
0
Rk+1(x˜k+1)dF (wk)
=
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)
+Gk+1(y
∗
k+1)(1− F (yk − y∗k+1))
+ γ2α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk − wk+1)dF (wk)dF (wk+1)
+ γα∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk − (yk − xk))dF (wk)
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k+1
γi−k
(
(pi+1 − ci+1)Di +Gi+1(y∗i+1)
))
+ γN−kcN+1DN + pk+1(Dk + Φ(yk))
− α∆ck+1(Φ(yN−2)− Φ(xk − qk−1)) + ck+1yk+1 − ck+1Dk
=
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)
−Gk+1(y∗k+1)F (yk − y∗k+1)
+ γ2α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk − wk+1)dF (wk)dF (wk+1)
+ (pk+1 − α∆ck+1)Φ(yk) + ck+1yk
+ γα∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xk − wk)dF (wk)
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+ α∆ck+1Φ(xk − qk−1) +Gk+1(y∗k+1)
+ (pk+1 − ck+1)Dk
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k+1
γi−k
(
(pi+1 − ci+1)Di +Gi+1(y∗i+1)
))
+ γN−kcN+1DN .
Therefore,
Rk(x˜k) = max
yk≥xk
{Gk(yk)}
+ γ2α∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
Φ(xk − wk)dF (wk)
+ γα∆ck+1Φ(xk − qk−1)
+
(
i=N−1∑
i=k
γi+1−k
(
(pi+1 − ci+1)Di +Gi+1(y∗i+1)
))
+ γN+1−kcN+1DN
+ pkmax(−xk, 0)− α∆ckmin(xk, qk−2 + qk−1)+ + ckxk
where
Gk(yk) = (−ck + γck+1 + pk)yk + (−γα∆ck+1 + γpk+1 − pk)Φ(yk)
− L(yk) + γ
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
Gk+1(yk − wk)dF (wk)
− γGk+1(y∗k+1)F (yk − y∗k+1)
+ γ3α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
Φ(yk − wk − wk+1)dF (wk)dF (wk+1).
For concavity check the second order condition.
∂Gk(yk)
∂yk
= (−ck + γck+1 + pk) + (−γα∆ck+1 + γpk+1 − pk)F (yk)
− (hk + bk)F (yk) + bk + γ
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
G
′
k+1(yk − wk)f(wk)dwk
+ γGk+1(y
∗
k+1)f(yk − y∗k+1)− γGk+1(y∗k+1)f(yk − y∗k+1)
+ γ3α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
F (yk − wk − wk+1)dF (wk)dF (wk)
= (−ck + γck+1 + pk + bk) + (−γα∆ck+1 + γpk+1 − pk − hk − bk)F (yk)
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+ γ
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
G
′
k+1(yk − wk)f(wk)dwk
+ γ3α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
F (yk − wk − wk+1)dF (wk)dF (wk+1),
∂2Gk(yk)
∂y2k
= (−γα∆ck+1 + γpk+1 − pk − hk − bk)f(yk)
+ γ
∫ yk−y∗k+1
0
G
′′
k+1(yk − wk)f(wk)dwk
+ γG
′
k+1(y
∗
k+1)f(yk − y∗k+1)
+ γ3α∆ck+3
∫ ∞
0
∫ ∞
0
f(yk − wk − wk+1)dF (wk)dF (wk+1).
Since Gk+1 is concave G
′′
k+1(yk − wk) ≤ 0 and G′k+1(y∗k+1) = 0 due to optimality,
therefore if (−γα∆ck+1 + γpk+1 − pk − h− b) ≤ 0, Gk(yk) is concave in yk.
The Hessian of Rk(x˜k) is,
∂2Rk(x˜k)
∂xk2
= γ2α∆ck+2
∫ ∞
0
f(xk − wk)dF (wk) + γα∆ck+1f(xk − qk−1),
∂2Rk(x˜k)
∂xk∂qk−1
= −γα∆ck+1f(xk − qk−1),
∂2Rk(x˜k)
∂xk∂qk−2
=
∂2Rk(x˜k)
∂qk−2∂xk
=
∂2Rk(x˜k)
∂qk−22
=
∂2Rk(x˜k)
∂qk−2∂qk−1
=
∂2Rk(x˜k)
∂qk−1∂qk−2
= 0,
∂2Rk(x˜k)
∂qk−1∂xk
= −γα∆ck+1f(xk − qk−1),
∂2Rk(x˜k)
∂qk−12
= γα∆ck+1f(xk − qk−1),
z = (u1 u2 u3)
t and let K = γ2α∆ck+2
∫∞
0
f(xk − wk)dF (wk) ≤ 0 and A =
γα∆ck+1f(xk − qk−1) ≤ 0.
ztHN−1z =
[
u1 u2 u3
]
K + A 0 −A
0 0 0
−A 0 A


u1
u2
u3

=
[
u1(K + A)− u3A 0 (−u1 + u3)A
]
u1
u2
u3

= (u1(K + A)− u3A)u1 + (−u1A+ u3A)u3 = Ku21 + A(u1 − u3)2 ≤ 0.
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Thus Rk(x˜k) is concave in xk, qk−2 and qk−1. Therefore, (iii) of Theorem 4 is
proven. The optimal ordering policy of the retailer is a base stock policy.
¤
Proof of Theorem 5We begin by solving the problem from the last period and
proceeding backwards for the case where the supplier offers a single protection
age limit to the retailer. Profit-to-go function at the N th period is,
RN(x˜N) = min
qN≥0
{−cNqN + pNEWN min(xN + qN ,Wk)− L(xN + qN)
− α∆cN min(xN , qN−1)+ − γα∆cN+1EWN{min(qN , xN + qN −WN)}+.
By using Lemma 3 and Lemma 4 the following can be obtained,
RN(x˜N) = min
yN≥xN
{−cNyN + pN(yN − Φ(yN))− L(yN)
− α∆min(xN , qN−1)+ − γα∆cN+1 (Φ(yN)− Φ(xN)) + cNxN}.
The profit-to-go function in terms of GN(yN) is,
RN(x˜N) = min
yN≥xN
{GN(yN)} − α∆min(xN , qN−1)+ + γα∆cN+1Φ(xN) + cNxN
where,
GN(yN) = yN(−cN + pN)− Φ(yN)(pN − γα∆cN+1)− L(yN).
For concavity, check the second order condition.
∂2GN(yN)
∂y2N
= −f(yN)(pN − γα∆cN+1)− (hN + bN)f(yN)
= f(yN)(γα∆cN+1 − pN − hN − bN) ≤ 0.
If γα∆cN+1 − pN − hN − bN ≤ 0, GN(yN) is concave in yN . Since all of the
components of the concavity condition equation is greater or equal to zero, the
condition is assured to be less than or equal to zero. Thus GN(yN) is concave
and attains the maximum at,
y∗N = F
−1
(
pN − cN − bN
pN − α∆cN+1 + hN + bN
)
.
The Hessian of RN(x˜N) is,
ztH(RN(x˜N))z =
[
u1 u2
] [ γα∆cN+1f(xN) 0
0 0
][
u1
u2
]
= γα∆cN+1f(xN)u
2
1 ≤ 0
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since ∆cN+1 ≤ 0. Thus RN(x˜N) is concave in qN−1 and xN . Therefore, in the last
period order-up-to level of the retailer is shown to be:
y∗N = F
−1
(
pN − cN − bN
pN − α∆cN+1 + hN + bN
)
2-period protection case can be derived similarly.
